PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS AND SOCIAL INTERACTION: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA*

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Abstract

Using survey data from China, this paper addresses the role played by physical appearance in an individual's social interaction. Our empirical results suggests that physically attractive people, both men and women, are more likely to be perceived by interviewers as being reliable and having better oral skills, but uncooperative during the interview. Physically attractive men have more weak ties (e.g., interpersonal contacts) but less strong ties (i.e., availability of assistance by others when needed). Conversely, while women's physical attractiveness does not have any impact on their weak ties, it has a positive effect on the availability of assistance and emotional support by others. These results are consistent with experimental results obtained by previous studies.

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1 Introduction

Empircal evidence obtained by scholars from difference social science disciplines indicates that there is a beauty premium in the market and social contexts. This suggests that physical appearance matters. We follow the same thread of research and explore the importance of physical appearance in social interaction. In this paper, we use survey data from China to investigate the effect of an individual's physical attractiveness on her pattern and outcomes of her social interaction, e.g., trustfulness, size and strength of social network, and the impression gives to others. In the data, the rating of a respondent's physical appearance by an interviewer is available.

Firstly, we look at the association between an individual's physical attractiveness and her trustfulness. Information on an individual's trustfulness comes from respondents' answers to a set of questions on trust, which are similar those used by the General Social Survey. Secondly, we investigate the relationship between physical attractiveness and the impression that an respondent gave to an interviewer during the interview. This relationship is informative on how an individual's physical attractiveness affect how she is perceived by strangers. Moreover, we examine how an individual's physical attractiveness affect her weak ties and strong times (in the sense of Granovetter, 1973). An individual's strong ties are measured by the number of people that she has contact with during a typical day, and proportion of these people that she knows. For an individual's strong ties we rely on the self-reported number of persons that could offer assistance and emotional support when needed. While these social ties are a form of social capital defined by Bourdieu (1986), Coleman (1988), and Lin (2001),[1] strong ties represent outcomes of repeated interaction of the respondent with others.

Finally, we explore the implication of physical attractiveness' impact on the beauty premium in the labor market. If is it true that physical attractiveness has a positve

[1]Coleman (pp. S98, 1988) states that *"Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a veriety of different entities, with tow elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors—whether persons or corporate actors—within the structure."* By contrast, it is defined by some other researchers as trust, social norms, or informal rules. Such definition emphasizes social capital as a type of positive group externality and may facilitate aggregate level analysis.

impact on social ties, then is possible that part of the beauty premium of wage can be attributed to these social ties. We proceed by controlling the strength and size of an individual's social network in our wage regressions.

For a respondent's phsical attractiveness, we also use interviewers' evaluation. However, to prevent possible simultaneity arising from the outcome variables' causal impact on the beauty measures, we use an interviewer's evaluation of a respondent's physical attractiveness in a previous interview (pertaining to year 2004) to explain the outcomes (pertaining to year 2006).

Our study contribute to the literature in several dimensions. Firstly, most studies on the impact of physical attractiveness on social interaction, i.e., Mulford, et al. (1998), Solnick and Schweitzer (1999), Wilson and Eckel (2006), and Andreoni and Petrie (2008), are based on laboratory experiments with small number of subjects. For example, Mulford, et al. (1998) report experimental findings obtained from 185 subjects, most of whom were undergraduate students (83%) and others were townspeople in the neighborhood of the University of Oregon (many of whom were homeless and jobless). Solnick and Schweitzer's (1999) experiments involve 206 subjects, who were undergraduates. Wilson and Eckel (2006) have 70 subjects, who were undergraduate students. Andreoni and Petrie's (2008) subjects in their experiments consist of 80 economics and business students.

Their results suggest a possible impact of physical attractiveness on social interaction outcomes. However, it is uncertain whether such results hold in the naturally occurring world, where people have a much bigger stake in the outcomes of their interaction with others than subjects in a laboratory experiment. Moreover, subjects in these experimental studies were mostly students and were mostly in their early twenties. It is questionable whether individuals from other age groups or social background will act similarly.[2] Our use of survey data, with a relative large sample size, allows us to examine in a non-experimental setting the validity of some of the results obtained by these experimental studies.

Furthermore, with survey data we are able to investigate the effect of physical at-

[2]Stuter and Kocher (2007) discover that trust and trustworthiness do differ across age groups.

tractiveness on the weak ties (e.g., number of interpersonal contacts) as well as strong ties (e.g., the availability of assistance or emotional support). Most previous studies in the literature investigate how physically attractive individuals are perceived by strangers (e.g., Dion, et al., 1972). Even though laboratory experiments allow researchers to observe repeated interactions among subjects, these interactions happen in a very short period of time. Thus, our study supplement previous studies by exploring the impact of physical attractiveness on the long-term outcomes of social interaction.

By examining the impact of an individual's physical attractiveness on the size and strength of her social networks, our study also contribute to the growing body of literature on the formation of social capital. To date, there are not many studies on the formation of social capital (see Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2000, Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote, 2002, and Alesina and Ferrara, 2002). However, increasingly social scientists are aware of the importance of understanding how social capital is formed and why do people invest in it. To our knowledge there are no studies looking at the association between social capital and other individual attributes.

Our findings are summarized as follows.

(a) While physically attractiveness women are more trustful, men's physical attractiveness is not related to their trustfulness.
(b) Physical attractiveness does have an impact on the impression that a respondent gave to an interviewer. We find that a physically attractive respondent, whether male or female, is perceived by interviewers as reliable, patient, and having good oral skills, but uncooperative.
(c) A physically attractive man has more interpersonal contacts and he is also more likely to know the people that he has contact with. Physical attractiveness does not have any impact on women's interpersonal contacts.
(d) Attractive women have more people offer assistance when needed, and more likely to have emotional support. On the contrary, physically attractive men are less likely to have any persons providing assistance they need it, and the emotional support they receive is similar to that of other men.
(e) We find that the effect of trustfulness, very weak ties (as measured by number of daily interpersonal contacts, i.e., `CONTACT`), and strong ties (as measured by the availability of assistance and emotional support by others, i.e., `HELP` and `SUPPORT`, respectively) have a positive effect, while other weak times (as measured the pro-

portion of people that an individual knows among those that she had contact with, i.e., KNOW) have a negative effect on wage. Moreover, an interviewer's rating of a respondent's oral skill is positively related to her wage.

Our findings have important implications on how people interact and the long-run implications of interacting agents' physical appearance. The results relating to interviewers' evaluation and interpersonal contact are consistent with previous studies' experimental results, where physically attractive individuals are judged more positively by strangers, and people have higher expectation on physically attractive individuals in terms of cooperativeness (see Mulford, et al., 1998, and Andereoni and Petrie, 2008).

Moreover, the results that physically attractive men have more weak ties and less strong ties indicate that men are not able to transform weak ties into strong ties. This implies that even though physically attractive men are treated better initially, due to the fact that they are no more trustful than other men, with long-term repeated interaction, they are punished for not living up to expectation so that they have less strong ties than other men. These results are also consistent with previous experimental results, where physically attractive people are offered more and demanded more (see, e.g., Solnick and Schweltzer, 1999, Andereoni and Petrie, 2008).

Further more, physical attractiveness may have a side effect on wage through its effect on weak ties and strong ties. Physically attractive men have more weak ties and less strong ties. We find that on balance the effect of physical attractiveness on social interaction constitute a minus to men's wage. We find that when we account for the impact of physical attractiveness on social interactions, men's beauty premium increases. It is the opposite for wemen, for whom the indirect effect of physical attractiveness via social interaction on net is positive. But for both men and women, quantitatively the proportion of beauty premium that can be accounted for by the net effect of weak and strong ties is not large.

Finally, as consistent with Mobius and Rosenblat's (2006) experimental results, we find that physically attractive individuals are more likely to have better oral skills, as rated by interviewers, and oral skills have a positive effect on wage. Thus, part of the beauty premium of wage can be attributed to oral skills' effect on wage. However,

whether or not we control for interviewers' evalustion of oral skills, quantitative the difference in the beauty premium of wage is not large.

The organization of the rest remaining part of paper is as follows. Section 2 Section 3 describes the data we use in the current study. Section 4 outlines our empirical strategy and discusses the results. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.

2 Literature Review

Our study is related to two strands of literature. The first concerns the impact of physical attractiveness on social and economic outcomes. The second concerns the formation of social capital. We attempt to make contribution to both strands of research. The role that an individual's physical attractiveness plays in affecting her social and economic outcomes has attracted the interest of social scientists, especially psychologists and economists, for decades. Scholars in different disciplines have difference focus. However, the findings obtained are consistent, i.e., physically attractive individuals are attributed positive qualities and treated more favorably.

Scholars in psychology focus primarily on how physically attractively individuals are perceived in experimental settings.[3] It is found that physically attractive individuals are in general judged more positively (e.g., being more sociable, friendly). Economists are more interested in the variation in market outcomes associated with physical attractiveness. According to the economic literature, there is a beauty premium, i.e., an individual's physically attractiveness has a positive impact on her socio-economic outcomes (e.g., being trusted, having higher earnings, etc.).

In a sries of studies on the impact of physically attractiveness on wage, e.g., Hamermesh and Biddle (1994), Biddle and Hamermesh (1998), Barry (2000), Hamermesh, Meng, and Zhang (2002), Tao (2008), it is found that there is a beauty premium in wage. The study of Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) is based on survey data from the U.S. and Canada; Biddle and Hamermesh (1998) is based on a sample of U.S. law school graduates; Hamermesh, Meng, and Zhang (2002) uses a sample of individuals from Shanghai

[3] See, e.g., Dion, et al. (1972) for an early study, or Brewer and Archer (2007) for a more recent study.

(China); and Barry (2000) obtains evidence from a large sample of British individuals. The beauty premium persists even after controlling for sorting of physically attractive people into interaction-intensive occupations. This indicates that the beauty premium may be due to both employers' discrimination (i.e., employer's preference for physically attractive employees) and beauty's productivity effect (i.e., customers' preference to be served by physically attractive employees).

Using laboratory experiments, Mobius and Rosenblat's (2006) findings suggest that the beauty premium in wage arises from three sources (a) physically attractive individuals are more confidence, (b) they are perceived to be more able, and (c) they have better oral skills. Moreover, based on a sample of Dutch advertising firms, it is also found that firms having physically attractive executives have have higher revenues.

There are also economic studies investigating how an individual's physical attractiveness affects the way she is treated in experimental settings, e.g., Mulford, et al. (1998), Solnick and Schweitzer (1999), Wilson and Eckel (2006), and Andreoni and Petrie (2008). In general, results obtained from laboratory experiments suggest that there is a beauty premium. However, this beauty premium vanishes if physically attractive individuals are found to be no different from others in their behavior.

In a prisoner's dilemma-type game involving the choices of play-versus-notplay and cooperate-versus-defect, Mulford, et al. (1998) find that a subject is more likely to enter play and cooperate with another subject she finds physically attractive. In Solnick and Schweitzer's (1999) altimatum game experiment, attractive subjects were offered more and were also expected to offer more. In an experiment, where a game involving trust and reciprocity is conducted, Wilson and Eckel (2006) find that attractive subjects are regarded as more trustworthy such that they earn more in the game initially. However, this initial beauty premium disappears because the physically attractive individuals do not live up to expectation and are panelized. In a public goods experiment conducted by Andreoni and Petrie (2008), physically attractive subjects earns a beauty premium when their contributions are not revealed to other subjects. However, physically attractive subjects are expected to be more cooperative and contribute more. That's why when physically attractive subjects' contributions are revealed, they are panelized for

not living up to these expectations (enven though their contributions are similar to others) and their beauty premium vanishes.

Our stutdy is also related to the growing body of research on the formation of social capital. While there is a voluminous literature on the impact of social capital on economic and social outcomes, studies on the the formation of social capital are still rare.[4] Notable examples of studies on the formation of social capital are Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000), Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002), and Alesina and Ferrara (2002). Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000) finds that homeowners have stronger social connection (e.g., involvement in local politics, social evenings with persons from the neighborhood, going to tavern or bar) . The empirical results of Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002) show that an individual's stock of social capital varies with her age, mobility expectation, occupation, physical distance, homeownership, investment in human capital, and this is is consistent with economic theory. Alesina and Ferrara (2002) find that an individual's trustfulness varies with her personal characteristics (e.g., age, education, income) and neighborhood characteristics (e.g., racial heterogeneity, income inequality).

3 Data

The data we use in this study come from a survey entitled *Panel Survey of Family Dynamics-China* (*PSFD-C* hereafter), which is a longitudinal survey of households in China. The *PSFD-C* is funded and steered by Academia Sinica, Taiwan, under the *Panel Survey of Family Dynamics* project for the purpose of understanding the pattern of interaction among members of a family in China for academic purpose. The *Panel Survey of Family Dynamics* project aims to understand the family in Chinese Societies through longitudinal surveys, and one has been ongoing since 1999 in Taiwan. The field work of the survey is conducted by the Institute of Population and Labor Economics, the Chinese Academy of Social Science. Data collection is by face-to-face interview.

The *PSFD-C* survey started in 2004. Initially it covered three coastal regions in

[4] See, e.g., Durlauf and Fafcomp (2005), and Mouw (2006) for recent reviews of the literature.

China, namely Shanghai City, Zhejiang Province, and and Fujian Province. The selection of these three regions is due the fact that these three regions represent different segments in the spectrum of urbanization and economic development in the eastern coastal China.[5] The targeted sample sizes of the three regions were set to be 1000, 2000, and 2000, respectively. The second wave was conducted in 2006. It is planned that the coverage of the survey will be extended to the province of Jiangsu in the third wave of *PSFD-C* to be conducted in the winter of 2008.

****MORE DETAILS TO BE ADDED****

Figure 1: Interviewers' Rating of Respondents' Physical Attractiveness.



4 Empirical Strategy and Results

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[5]While Shanghai has the highest degree of urbanization and economic development, Zhejiang is medium, and Fujian is the lowest among the three regions in the spectrum.

Table 1: Frequency Distribution of Interviewers' Evaluation of Respondents' Physical Attractiveness

Interviewer's	Male		Female	
Rating	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
1	0	0.00	2	0.12
2	3	0.15	9	0.54
3	26	1.26	13	0.79
4	49	2.37	43	2.60
5	178	8.62	130	7.85
6	344	16.65	294	17.76
7	541	26.19	411	24.83
8	587	28.41	473	28.58
9	241	11.67	184	11.12
10	97	4.70	96	5.80
Total	2066	100.00	1655	100.00

Table 2: Frequency Distribution of `WILLHELP`

Response	Male		Female	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
(1) Strongly Disagree	55	2.66	50	3.02
(2)	154	7.45	122	7.37
(3)	443	21.44	348	21.03
(4)	590	28.56	452	27.31
(5) Strongly Agree	824	39.88	683	41.27
Total	2066	100.00	1655	100.00

Table 3: Frequency Distribution of `NOCARE`

Response	Male		Female	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
(1) Strongly Disagree	596	28.85	526	31.78
(2)	488	23.62	342	20.66
(3)	513	24.83	391	23.63
(4)	279	13.50	223	13.47
(5) Strongly Agree	190	9.20	173	10.45
Total	2066	100.00	1655	100.00

Table 4: Interviewers' Evaluation of the Reliability of Respondents' Responses

Response	Male		Female	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
(1) Not at All	5	0.24	2	0.12
(2)	52	2.52	36	2.18
(3)	1346	65.15	1071	64.71
(4) Very	663	32.09	546	32.99
Total	2066	100.00	1655	100.00

Table 5: Interviewers' Evaluation of Respondents' Cooperativeness

Response	Male		Female	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
(1) Not at All	7	0.34	5	0.30
(2)	51	2.47	53	3.20
(3)	987	47.77	777	46.95
(4) Very	1021	49.42	820	49.55
Total	2066	100.00	1655	100.00

Table 6: Interviewers' Evaluation of Respondents' Impatience

Response	Male		Female	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
(1) Not at All	1359	65.78	1068	64.53
(2)	617	29.86	498	30.09
(3)	71	3.44	78	4.71
(4) All the Time	19	0.92	11	0.66
Total	2066	100.00	1655	100.00

Table 7: Interviewers' Evaluation of Respondents' Oral Skills

Response	Male		Female	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
(1) Very Poor	4	0.19	1	0.06
(2)	22	1.06	21	1.27
(3)	272	13.17	238	14.38
(4)	1169	56.58	924	55.83
(5) Very Good	599	28.99	471	28.46
Total	2066	100.00	1655	100.00

Table 8: Respondents' Daily Contacts

Response	Male		Female	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
(1) 0–4 Persons	134	6.49	179	10.82
(2) 5–9 Persons	393	19.02	443	26.77
(3) 10–19 Persons	713	34.51	532	32.15
(4) 20–49 Persons	483	23.38	311	18.79
(4) 50–99 Persons	207	10.02	108	6.53
(6) ≥ 100 Persons	136	6.58	82	4.95
Total Persons	2066	100.00	1655	100.00

Table 9: How Many Do Repondents' Know Among the Persons Contacted

Response	Male		Female	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
(1) Almost None	87	4.21	69	4.17
(2) A Few	101	4.89	67	4.05
(3) About Half	758	36.69	578	34.92
(4)Almost All	1120	54.21	941	56.86
Total	2066	100.00	1655	100.00

Table 10: Definition of Social Interaction and Trust Variables

Variable	Definition
RELIABLE	The variable is derived from the following question answered by an interviewer. *"Do you think the respondent's answers to the questions reliable?"* [1 ("Not at All")– 4 ("Very")] RELIABLE is coded 1 if the interviewer indicated "Very" and 0 otherwise.
COOPERATE	The variable is derived from the following question answered by an interviewer. *"Was the respondent cooperative during the interview?"* [1 ("Not at all")–4 ("Very")] COOPERATE is coded "1" if the interviewer indicated 1 and 2, "2" and "3" if 3 and 4, respectively.
IMPATIENT	The variable is derived from the following question answered by an interviewer. *"Did the respondent show impatience?"* [1 ("Not at all")–4 ("All the time")] IMPATIENT is coded "1" if the interviewer indicated 1 and 2, "2" and "3" if 3 and 4, respectively.
ORALSKILL	The variable is derived from the following question answered by an interviewer. *"What do you think about the oral skills of the respondent during the interview?"* [1 ("Very poor")–5 ("Very good")] ORALSKILL is coded "1", "2", and "3" if the interviewer indicated 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and "4" if 4 and 5, respectively.
CONTACT	The variable is derived from the following question. *How many people do you have contact (saying "hello", talking, through writing, whether you know them personally or not) with in a typical day?* (1) 0–4 persons; (2) 5–9 persons; (3) 10–19 persons; (4) 20–49 persons; (5) 50–99 persons; or (6) over 100 persons.
KNOW	The variable is derived from the following question. *Among those people you have contact with in a typical day, how many of them do you know personally?* (1) Almost none; (2) A few; (3) About half; or (4) almost all.
HELP0 & HELP	Whether or not help from others is available and number of persons who will help. These variables are derived from the following questions. *"When you have the need, will there be people coming to help you? If yes, how many?"*
HELP+	Equals HELP if HELP>0.
SUPPORT0 & SUPPORT	Whether or not emotional support from others is available and number of persons who will offer. These variables are solicited by the following question. *"When you are feel worried or distressed, Do you have anybody to talk to? If yes, how many?"*
SUPPORT+	Equals SUPPORT if SUPPORT>0.
NOTRUST	The variable is derived from summing the responses to the following three questions. (a) *"We be carefully when dealing with others."* [1 ("strongly diagree")–5 ("strongly agree")] (b) *"We must be carefully when dealing even with people who are know."* [1 ("strongly diagree")–5 ("strongly agree")] (c) *"If we are not watchful, we will be taken advantage."* [1 ("Strongly diagree")–5 ("Strongly agree")]
NOCARE	The variable is derived from the following question . *"When you have trouble, no one care about you."* [1 ("Strongly diagree")–5 ("Strongly agree")]
WILLHELP	The variable is derived from the following question. *"Most people will ignore their own interest and help others."* [1 ("Strongly diagree")–5 ("Strongly agree")]

Table 11: Definition of Variables

Variable	Definition
BEAUTY	Interview's rating of physical appearance in the 2004 interview. Ranging 1–10. It is solicited by a question to be completed by an interviewer. *Please give an overall rating of the facial and physical appearance of the respondent. The highest is 10 and the lowest is 1.* For the sake of ease of interpretation, we standardize the variable so that it has zero mean and unit variance.
SELFEMPLOYED	Whether or not owner of a partnership business without other employees. SELFEMPLOYED=1 if yes; SELFEMPLOYED=0 otherwise.
EMPLOYER	Whether or not Business owner, with one or more employees. EMPLOYER=1 if yes, EMPLOYER=0 otherwise.
GOVERNMENT	Whether or not government employee. GOVERNMENT=1 if yes, GOVERNMENT=0 otherwise.
PRIVATECOM	Whether or not employee of private company. PRIVATECOM=1 if yes, PRIVATECOM=0 otherwise.
COLLECTIVE	Whether or not employee of a collective enterprise or township enterprise. COLLECTIVE=1 if yes, COLLECTIVE=0 otherwise.
INCOME10K	Annual income in 10,000.
BMI	Body mass index.
HEIGHT	Height in meters.
SHANGHAI	Whether or not reside in Shanghai. SHANGHAI=1 if yes, SHANGHAI=0 otherwise.
ZHEJIANG	Whether or not reside in Zhejiang. ZHEJIANG=1 if yes, ZHEJIANG=0 otherwise.
MARRIED	Whther Married or not. MARRIED=1 if yes, MARRIED=0, otherwise.
NOEDU	Highest education level: No formal education. NOEDU=1, if yes; NOEDU=0, otherwise.
ELEMENTARY	Highest education level: Elementary school. ELEMENTARY=1 if yes, ELEMENTARY=0 otherwise.
HIGHSCHOOL	Highest education level: High school. HIGHSCHOOL=1 if yes, HIGHSCHOOL=0 otherwise.
COLLEGE	Highest education level: College or above. COLLEGE=1 if yes, ELEMENTARY=0 otherwise.
AGE	Age.
AGE^2	Age squared.
HEALTH	Self-evaluated health status. Ranging 1–5, with HEALTH=1 if very good, and HEALTH=5 if very poor.
SICK	Whether any sickness or other injury affect daily live or work. SICK=1 if yes, SICK=0 otherwise.
CHILDREN	Number of children.
WORK	Whether working or not. WORK=1 if yes, WORK=0 otherwise.
WAGERATE	Log hourly wage rate. Constructed by dividing total monthly by monthly work hours.
INTERVIEWER	First principle component of RELIABLE, COOPERATE, and IMPATIENT.
REFUSE1	Respondent has refused to be interviewed at the beginning of the intervie. REFUSE1=1 if yes, REFUSE1=0 otherwise.
REFUSE2	Respondent has refused interviewed during the interview. REFUSE2=1 if yes, REFUSE2=0 otherwise.
REFUSE3	Respondent has refused interviewed right before the end of interview. REFUSE3=1 if yes, REFUSE3=0 otherwise.
REFUSE4	Respondent has never refused during the interview. REFUSE4=1 if yes, REFUSE4=0 otherwise.
IWTIME	Length of interview, in minutes.
IWNUMBER	Number of sessions required to complete the interview.

Table 12: Physical Attractiveness and Trustfulness[†]

	Male			Female		
	WILLHELP	NOCARE	NOTRUST	WILLHELP	NOCARE	NOTRUST
BEAUTY	0.0092	0.0088	−0.0519	−0.0314	−0.0328***	−0.1725*
	(0.4438)	(0.1922)	(−0.4069)	(−0.9291)	(−3.2135)	(−1.6954)
SELFEMPLOYED	−0.0882	−0.0794	−0.1309	0.0259	−0.1562***	−0.2956
	(−1.4243)	(−0.9005)	(−0.3037)	(0.2540)	(−12.1135)	(−1.1318)
EMPLOYER	−0.0726	−0.2534	−0.4671	−0.2246	−0.0264	−1.5572***
	(−0.7301)	(−1.4836)	(−1.4760)	(−0.8716)	(−0.0805)	(−5.0610)
GOVERNMENT	−0.0484	−0.0086	−0.6126	0.3522**	−0.0211	0.0428
	(−0.2639)	(−0.0456)	(−1.5687)	(2.5519)	(−0.1271)	(0.1853)
PRIVATECOM	0.0501	−0.1830***	0.0590	0.0005	−0.0856	0.2536**
	(1.2897)	(−3.2254)	(0.2545)	(0.0043)	(−0.3730)	(2.4550)
COLLECTIVE	−0.4329***	0.0603**	−1.5224***	−0.1885	−0.2870**	−0.2674
	(−6.0088)	(2.3578)	(−26.0718)	(−0.6675)	(−2.1475)	(−0.8942)
INCOME10K	0.2202***	0.1635***	0.0153	−0.0276	−0.8010***	−1.1209
	(3.2045)	(3.4060)	(0.0784)	(−0.1414)	(−6.5808)	(−2.0885)
BMI	0.0143	−0.0043	−0.0164	−0.0124**	0.0053	0.0115
	(0.9994)	(−0.8872)	(−0.4025)	(−2.0836)	(0.5092)	(0.3297)
HEIGHT	−0.1838	0.3409	−0.3411	0.4591	0.0791	3.4502
	(−0.3206)	(0.8133)	(−0.3473)	(0.8243)	(0.1830)	(1.0502)
SHANGHAI	0.2534***	0.3487***	0.8166***	0.2431***	0.2096***	0.3936
	(4.5503)	(5.6233)	(2.9480)	(22.9409)	(3.5199)	(0.9122)
ZHEJIANG	0.1359***	−0.0080	0.5388***	0.2072***	0.2061***	0.7062***
	(8.0004)	(−0.3018)	(5.0173)	(8.8526)	(8.3711)	(7.2237)
MARRIED	0.0166	−0.1440***	−0.3740**	0.1576**	0.0053	−0.1765
	(0.5451)	(−4.0157)	(−2.4502)	(2.1330)	(0.1836)	(−1.3898)
ELEMENTARY	−0.0262	−0.1677***	−0.0330	0.0942***	−0.0658**	0.0296
	(−0.3297)	(−3.1763)	(−0.1377)	(3.5389)	(−2.5009)	(0.2481)
HIGHSCHOOL	0.0856	−0.2087***	0.0484	0.2131***	−0.1300	−0.5665**
	(0.8768)	(−5.9753)	(0.1614)	(7.2983)	(−1.1123)	(−2.0336)
COLLEGE	0.2380	−0.3957**	−0.8205	0.3672	−0.2944***	−1.0335
	(1.0333)	(−2.0650)	(−1.1372)	(1.5503)	(−3.5099)	(−1.4812)
AGE	0.0028	0.0465***	0.0366	0.0162	0.0031	0.0587
	(0.5761)	(5.1624)	(0.8480)	(0.4127)	(0.1515)	(0.9042)
AGE^2	−0.0000	−0.0005***	−0.0004	−0.0001	−0.0000	−0.0007
	(−0.0037)	(−4.0333)	(−0.9558)	(−0.3010)	(−0.1754)	(−1.2947)
HEALTH	−0.1095**	0.1143***	0.0333	−0.0086	0.0485***	0.0391
	(−2.3545)	(5.0266)	(0.2966)	(−0.6326)	(2.9915)	(0.1918)
SICK	0.2498**	−0.1638**	−0.0305	0.0282	−0.0474	0.2874***
	(2.3655)	(−1.9679)	(−0.1232)	(0.7934)	(−0.6758)	(4.9939)
CHILDREN	0.0331	0.0040	0.1823	0.0348*	0.0080	0.1596
	(1.0567)	(0.0771)	(1.6598)	(1.7416)	(0.1017)	(1.0583)
WORK	0.0727*	0.0300	0.8156***	−0.0210	0.0961	0.5172***
	(1.9253)	(0.3538)	(3.8165)	(−0.1421)	(0.5646)	(9.0379)
CONSTANT			9.5899***			2.7940
			(3.7213)			(0.4534)
$CUTOFF_1$	−1.7595***	0.9655		−0.5306	−0.0353	
	(−4.2567)	(1.5867)		(−0.5699)	(−0.0450)	
$CUTOFF_2$	−1.0981**	1.5990**		0.0913	0.5083	
	(−2.4667)	(2.5462)		(0.1081)	(0.6339)	
$CUTOFF_3$	−0.2916	2.3001***		0.8828	1.1661	
	(−0.5734)	(3.5208)		(1.0978)	(1.4580)	
$CUTOFF_4$	0.4601	2.8925***		1.6039**	1.7211**	
	(0.9275)	(4.3630)		(2.0260)	(2.1997)	
R^2			0.026			0.034
Pseudo R^2	0.011	0.012		0.013	0.009	
Log-Like.	-2747.2	-3132.146	-5228.54	-2197.873	-2522.058	-4211.436
Observation		2066			1655	

[†]Estimated by ordered probit (WILLHELP and NOCARE) and OLS (NOTRUST). *t*-statistics in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level.

Table 13: Physical Attractiveness and Interviews' Evaluation[†]

	MALE				FEMALE			
	RELIABLE	COOPERATE	IMPATIENT	ORALSKILL	RELIABLE	COOPERATE	IMPATIENT	ORALSKILL
BEAUTY	0.0658***	−0.0544***	0.0290*	0.1249***	0.0756***	−0.0612	0.0551	0.0637***
	(3.1959)	(−13.7510)	(1.8398)	(5.0977)	(2.6996)	(−1.6346)	(1.3001)	(3.4327)
REFUSE1	−0.5960***	1.2317***	−1.0614***	−0.4913***	−0.8601***	1.1692***	−1.0365***	−0.5151***
	(−3.4349)	(16.8148)	(−8.4596)	(−10.2566)	(−9.6787)	(13.4824)	(−23.6619)	(−9.1403)
REFUSE2	−1.6647***	1.6250***	−1.5632***	−0.9283***	−0.4996**	1.2466***	−1.0787***	−0.6086***
	(−4.6122)	(25.9825)	(−10.2630)	(−6.7676)	(−2.3052)	(13.4966)	(−5.6226)	(−5.8418)
REFUSE3	−0.2096	0.7096***	−0.8734***	−0.3046***	−0.1117	1.3788***	−0.9876***	−0.6162
	(−0.6544)	(5.5128)	(−4.9048)	(−3.9903)	(−0.2777)	(9.8683)	(−3.0805)	(−1.2956)
REFUSE4	−0.0580***	−0.3013***	0.1545***	0.0414	0.0144	−0.2940	0.3005**	−0.0186
	(−2.6294)	(−3.7526)	(2.5794)	(0.5006)	(0.1099)	(−1.5784)	(1.9805)	(−1.0904)
IWTIME	−0.0005	0.0011**	−0.0011**	−0.0005	−0.0007	0.0012	−0.0011	−0.0005
	(−0.4317)	(2.0947)	(−2.3871)	(−0.6555)	(−1.0486)	(1.1018)	(−1.5139)	(−0.7333)
IWNUMBER	−0.1660	0.1263	−0.1447	−0.0299	−0.3967***	0.2850***	−0.3035***	−0.1674**
	(−0.9546)	(0.8965)	(−0.8689)	(−0.2858)	(−2.6650)	(6.8298)	(−3.8876)	(−2.0859)
WILLHELP	0.1152***	−0.0974***	0.1119***	0.1093***	0.0713***	−0.0789***	0.0674**	0.0748**
	(3.0950)	(−3.6806)	(11.4405)	(5.7843)	(23.7856)	(−2.7638)	(2.1986)	(2.4158)
NOCARE	−0.0198	−0.0064	−0.0386	0.0040	0.0094	0.0210	−0.0288	−0.0369***
	(−1.6345)	(−0.4129)	(−1.4895)	(0.2249)	(0.2432)	(0.4533)	(−0.5632)	(−2.8909)
NOTRUST	−0.0152***	0.0122**	−0.0144***	−0.0167***	−0.0120	0.0286***	−0.0097	−0.0282***
	(−2.7464)	(2.0220)	(−3.0416)	(−3.4540)	(−0.6328)	(2.9195)	(−1.0521)	(−2.8999)
SELFEMPLOYED	−0.1093	0.2019**	−0.2942***	−0.1399	0.0906	0.2160**	−0.1253	−0.1385*
	(−0.6867)	(2.3511)	(−5.7311)	(−0.9868)	(0.5735)	(1.9651)	(−0.5377)	(−1.6623)
EMPLOYER	0.0439	−0.0442	−0.2059**	−0.0099	−0.6172*	0.5619***	−0.1576***	−0.5660***
	(0.3070)	(−0.5640)	(−2.5637)	(−0.0320)	(−1.7312)	(7.1567)	(−4.5689)	(−4.3902)
GOVERNMENT	0.3775***	−0.1484**	0.2010*	0.2659***	0.1518	0.3738***	−0.0398	0.4289***
	(3.7145)	(−2.0193)	(1.6606)	(5.4019)	(0.8847)	(2.8508)	(−0.2827)	(3.1944)
PRIVATECOM	0.2222***	0.0162	−0.0045	0.0646	0.1344**	0.1984**	−0.0868	0.0138
	(5.7984)	(0.1306)	(−0.1002)	(0.5009)	(2.1274)	(2.2159)	(−0.8660)	(0.0964)
COLLECTIVE	0.2870*	−0.1299	0.4160	0.2957	0.3947***	0.2631**	−0.1910***	0.1643
	(1.6856)	(−0.3517)	(1.2249)	(1.4547)	(3.6941)	(2.0516)	(−8.5570)	(1.3140)
INCOME10K	−0.0354	0.2130	−0.0971	0.4329***	0.4235	0.1146	0.0367	0.9125*
	(−0.3292)	(1.4960)	(−0.3678)	(2.5846)	(1.5506)	(0.7126)	(0.2441)	(1.6782)
BMI	−0.0146	0.0098***	−0.0025	0.0096***	0.0029	−0.0102	0.0144*	0.0072
	(−1.2431)	(3.1610)	(−0.4193)	(2.5807)	(0.3209)	(−1.0453)	(1.9530)	(1.3777)
HEIGHT	−0.0839	0.9607	−0.2243***	0.6600	−1.1402***	0.0723	−0.3628	0.8291
	(−0.1898)	(1.1388)	(−4.4677)	(1.4652)	(−3.1408)	(0.7536)	(−0.5089)	(1.6186)
SHANGHAI	0.3410***	−0.1137**	0.2908***	0.1769***	0.4403***	−0.3566***	0.4968***	0.3066***
	(5.1235)	(−2.1821)	(5.1447)	(2.9955)	(16.9816)	(−5.7497)	(6.4860)	(6.7310)
ZHEJIANG	0.1922***	−0.0593***	0.2389***	0.0475	0.1933***	−0.2268***	0.3263***	0.1546***
	(4.9570)	(−38.1335)	(8.1590)	(1.0982)	(15.0200)	(−8.8637)	(18.5727)	(4.9593)
MARRIED	0.2855**	−0.0666***	0.2841**	0.1548	−0.1037***	0.0429	−0.0455	0.0553
	(2.4980)	(−3.4959)	(2.5128)	(1.2843)	(−2.6291)	(0.5209)	(−0.9000)	(0.3571)
ELEMENTARY	0.1804*	−0.1001	0.0699	0.2430	−0.1121	0.0735***	0.0206	0.0809
	(1.7282)	(−0.9784)	(1.1350)	(1.3801)	(−1.0936)	(4.6887)	(0.5284)	(0.6211)
HIGHSCHOOL	0.1992	−0.1533***	0.1445***	0.3487***	−0.1416***	0.0480	−0.0511	0.2281***
	(1.3465)	(−27.6445)	(3.3745)	(4.0538)	(−6.7663)	(0.5131)	(−0.3701)	(2.9019)
COLLEGE	0.2634	−0.1687***	0.1990	0.5827***	−0.2808	0.2643	−0.2298	0.2568
	(0.8009)	(−2.7253)	(1.5207)	(6.5481)	(−1.4390)	(0.7972)	(−0.8674)	(0.9660)
AGE	−0.0480**	−0.0140	−0.0119	−0.0287	−0.0583***	0.0275**	−0.0416**	−0.0451
	(−2.0057)	(−0.5959)	(−0.4095)	(−1.5832)	(−5.2092)	(2.0604)	(−2.1080)	(−1.4456)
AGE^2	0.0006***	0.0001	0.0002	0.0004**	0.0006***	−0.0002	0.0004**	0.0004
	(2.9275)	(0.4449)	(0.8893)	(1.9898)	(4.3366)	(−1.6345)	(2.0476)	(1.3411)
HEALTH	−0.0186***	0.0313	−0.0988*	−0.0915***	−0.0727	−0.0373	−0.0282	−0.1417**
	(−2.7422)	(1.6262)	(−1.6463)	(−7.0678)	(−1.3668)	(−0.9742)	(−0.5737)	(−2.1312)
SICK	0.1558	−0.1384***	0.1984***	−0.0666	0.0695	−0.0992	0.0349	0.2161**
	(1.2383)	(−3.9884)	(12.3694)	(−0.9042)	(0.5970)	(−1.0189)	(0.2116)	(2.1439)
CHILDREN	−0.0080	−0.0507**	−0.0018	−0.0308	−0.0319	−0.0243	0.0013	−0.0519*
	(−0.2090)	(−2.0194)	(−0.3281)	(−1.0733)	(−0.9392)	(−0.4336)	(0.4802)	(−1.8519)
WORK	−0.0143	−0.1615***	0.2635***	0.0209	−0.0284	−0.3655***	0.1985***	−0.0684
	(−0.1173)	(−2.8098)	(5.1758)	(0.1307)	(−0.5486)	(−5.5036)	(3.4652)	(−1.5693)
CONSTANT	−0.3406				−3.2917***			
	(−0.4785)				(−6.0451)			
$CUTOFF_1$		1.3293	−2.4385***	−1.1911		1.0726***	−3.5307***	−2.5731***
		(1.4228)	(−2.9336)	(−1.3674)		(4.5224)	(−4.8470)	(−4.2240)
$CUTOFF_2$		3.0487***	0.0163	0.1468		2.7097***	−1.2448*	−1.2282**
		(3.5767)	(0.0210)	(0.1596)		(8.9744)	(−1.6646)	(−2.4614)
$CUTOFF_3$				1.9160**				0.5134
				(1.9777)				(1.0492)
Pseudo R^2	0.070	0.155	0.136	0.075	0.060	0.169	0.130	0.080
Log-like.	-1205.506	-1349.289	-1431.507	-1916.570	-986.6844	-1102.309	-1180.624	-1551.730
Observation		2066				1655		

[†]Estimated by probit (RELIABLE,) ordered probit (COOPERATE, IMPATIENT, and ORALSKILL) and t-statistics in parentheses.
***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level.

Table 14: Principal Component Analysis of Interviewers' Evaluation of the Cooperativeness and Impatienceof the Respondent, and Reliability of the Responses.

	Principal Components	
	Eigenvalue	Proportion
Component 1	2.1073	0.7024
Component 2	0.6025	0.2008
Component 3	0.2903	0.0968
	Factor Loadings for Component 1	
Cooperativeness	0.6241	
Reliability	0.5383	
Impatience	−0.5664	

Table 15: Physical Attractiveness and Interpersonal Contacts[†]

	MALE				FEMALE			
	CONTACT		KNOW		CONTACT		KNOW	
BEAUTY	0.0394***	0.0305**	0.0468***	0.0536***	0.0102	0.0095	0.0628	0.0652
	(3.4012)	(2.1805)	(6.5828)	(9.6106)	(0.4006)	(0.3605)	(1.4190)	(1.4946)
INTERVIEWER		0.0101		0.0360		0.0059		0.0304
		(0.5391)		(1.0461)		(0.1711)		(0.4932)
ORALSKILL		0.1031		−0.1308***		0.0174		−0.1123*
		(1.4580)		(−6.7435)		(0.2147)		(−1.7283)
WILLHELP	0.0674**	0.0592**	0.0411	0.0435	0.0406***	0.0392**	0.0437	0.0455
	(2.0800)	(2.0477)	(1.3265)	(1.2444)	(2.7763)	(2.5209)	(1.3490)	(1.5408)
NOCARE	−0.0120	−0.0115	−0.0667***	−0.0659***	−0.0601	−0.0593	−0.0108	−0.0121
	(−0.7412)	(−0.7082)	(−3.2251)	(−3.3465)	(−1.3402)	(−1.3755)	(−0.5585)	(−0.5360)
NOTRUST	0.0068***	0.0078***	0.0078	0.0074	0.0305***	0.0310***	−0.0015	−0.0026
	(4.6496)	(3.4843)	(0.3523)	(0.3470)	(2.8296)	(2.9078)	(−0.1072)	(−0.1704)
SELFEMPLOYED	0.4168***	0.4295***	−0.5874***	−0.5885***	0.5414***	0.5433***	−0.7920***	−0.8000***
	(7.0279)	(6.7975)	(−8.7929)	(−9.4093)	(3.3826)	(3.4934)	(−4.4082)	(−4.2626)
EMPLOYER	0.3583**	0.3609**	−0.1686	−0.1666	0.3410	0.3509	−0.4611*	−0.4770
	(2.5131)	(2.3113)	(−0.8901)	(−0.8062)	(1.5251)	(1.6194)	(−1.7160)	(−1.5479)
GOVERNMENT	0.4528***	0.4403***	−0.3796***	−0.3684***	0.4783***	0.4743***	−0.3625**	−0.3358**
	(8.9315)	(8.4660)	(−21.8516)	(−17.1160)	(6.9665)	(6.3462)	(−2.1747)	(−2.0086)
PRIVATECOM	0.3320***	0.3266***	−0.1611***	−0.1583***	0.2221	0.2231	−0.1471	−0.1439
	(8.3412)	(12.2557)	(−4.7606)	(−6.4895)	(1.3893)	(1.4368)	(−1.1665)	(−1.0416)
COLLECTIVE	0.4801***	0.4624***	−0.1804***	−0.1705***	0.6442**	0.6420**	−0.4319***	−0.4221***
	(6.3308)	(8.9812)	(−10.1744)	(−10.6777)	(2.5180)	(2.5709)	(−3.0582)	(−2.9283)
INCOME10K	0.2352***	0.2206***	−0.0692	−0.0334	1.1802***	1.1767***	−0.5714***	−0.5304***
	(12.4752)	(41.8480)	(−1.3538)	(−0.7951)	(2.8911)	(2.6517)	(−5.2844)	(−5.3181)
BMI	0.0134	0.0129	−0.0167*	−0.0157	0.0241***	0.0239***	−0.0041	−0.0043
	(1.1615)	(1.1318)	(−1.6933)	(−1.5552)	(3.1596)	(3.1598)	(−0.6519)	(−0.7387)
HEIGHT	0.2223	0.2038	−0.7575**	−0.6977*	−0.0563	−0.0600	−0.4925*	−0.4128**
	(0.3179)	(0.2879)	(−2.0807)	(−1.8838)	(−0.8794)	(−0.7197)	(−1.9099)	(−2.1395)
SHANGHAI	−0.2774***	−0.2843***	0.0897***	0.0950***	−0.1247***	−0.1288***	−0.0662	−0.0621
	(−5.0296)	(−5.5521)	(3.8612)	(4.0696)	(−3.1828)	(−3.8973)	(−1.5360)	(−1.1410)
ZHEJIANG	0.0538***	0.0485***	0.0036	0.0004	0.0797*	0.0760	−0.0037	−0.0032
	(6.2053)	(4.2172)	(0.4914)	(0.0305)	(1.6951)	(1.5599)	(−0.1450)	(−0.0795)
MARRIED	−0.0459	−0.0604**	−0.0236	−0.0229	0.1132	0.1128	−0.0743	−0.0674
	(−0.9670)	(−2.1213)	(−0.2575)	(−0.2122)	(1.3485)	(1.3627)	(−0.8578)	(−0.8193)
ELEMENTARY	0.1543***	0.1364***	−0.0817	−0.0689	0.0283	0.0279	0.0390	0.0446
	(13.3998)	(3.7271)	(−0.8368)	(−0.8241)	(0.5007)	(0.4593)	(0.3127)	(0.3756)
HIGHSCHOOL	0.2261***	0.2031***	−0.0085	0.0105	0.0943	0.0928	−0.1676**	−0.1517**
	(5.4620)	(3.3514)	(−0.1839)	(0.2556)	(1.4146)	(1.3444)	(−2.2050)	(−2.5622)
COLLEGE	0.4150***	0.3774***	−0.1233**	−0.0936**	−0.1100	−0.1093	−0.1125	−0.0873
	(3.4470)	(2.6025)	(−2.5535)	(−2.0245)	(−0.9722)	(−0.8434)	(−0.5230)	(−0.3753)
AGE	0.0225*	0.0254*	−0.0019	−0.0036	0.0260***	0.0269***	−0.0014	−0.0022
	(1.9091)	(1.7505)	(−0.1245)	(−0.2083)	(3.3517)	(4.0510)	(−0.0521)	(−0.0720)
AGE^2	−0.0003**	−0.0003**	0.0001	0.0001	−0.0003***	−0.0003***	0.0001	0.0001
	(−2.4950)	(−2.1782)	(0.6313)	(0.6505)	(−4.2036)	(−5.0911)	(0.3136)	(0.3051)
HEALTH	−0.1538***	−0.1485***	−0.0049	−0.0098	−0.1209***	−0.1190***	−0.0397**	−0.0476***
	(−7.4285)	(−7.7211)	(−0.1191)	(−0.2347)	(−3.9589)	(−3.8136)	(−2.4858)	(−2.7540)
SICK	0.1007	0.1021	0.0352	0.0210	0.1073***	0.1039***	0.1481	0.1588
	(0.9792)	(0.9441)	(0.3525)	(0.2211)	(21.6238)	(12.4657)	(1.0949)	(1.1858)
CHILDREN	0.0350**	0.0358**	0.1252***	0.1237***	0.0279	0.0285	0.0304***	0.0263***
	(2.3404)	(2.5519)	(4.6170)	(4.6722)	(0.4958)	(0.4814)	(3.7495)	(2.6320)
WORK	0.3198***	0.3170***	0.0803*	0.0729*	0.2197***	0.2172***	0.2473*	0.2356
	(2.5775)	(2.8795)	(1.8315)	(1.7771)	(2.8770)	(3.5211)	(1.8087)	(1.4242)
$CUTOFF_1$	−0.0013	0.2807	−3.2168***	−3.5329***	0.0627	0.1290	−2.6156***	−2.8834***
	(−0.0013)	(0.3329)	(−3.9223)	(−4.2934)	(0.1570)	(0.3538)	(−4.8212)	(−5.2915)
$CUTOFF_2$	0.9546	1.2381	−2.8097***	−3.1239***	1.0686**	1.1347***	−2.2550***	−2.5224***
	(1.0344)	(1.5959)	(−3.5036)	(−3.8770)	(2.3841)	(2.7992)	(−4.1334)	(−4.6387)
$CUTOFF_3$	1.9722**	2.2590***	−1.5153*	−1.8266**	2.0005***	2.0668***	−0.9790**	−1.2440***
	(2.0254)	(2.7849)	(−1.8505)	(−2.2197)	(3.9869)	(4.6207)	(−2.0485)	(−2.6160)
$CUTOFF_4$	2.7622***	3.0519***			2.7728***	2.8394***		
	(2.7719)	(3.6819)			(5.0830)	(5.7867)		
$CUTOFF_5$	3.3438***	3.6351***			3.2745***	3.3414***		
	(3.4097)	(4.5209)			(5.1020)	(5.8433)		
pseudo	0.058	0.060	0.037	0.039	0.060	0.060	0.033	0.034
Log-Like.	-3131.562	-3126.209	-1950.381	-1946.879	-2487.065	-2486.836	-1521.561	-1519.496
Observation	2066				1655			

[†]Estimated by ordered probit and t-statistics in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level.

Table 16: Physical Attractiveness, and Assistance from Others[†]

	MALE				FEMALE			
	HELP0	HELP0	HELP+	HELP+	HELP0	HELP0	HELP+	HELP+
BEAUTY	−0.0395***	−0.0447***	0.3557	0.3351	0.0337	0.0330	0.3149*	0.3161*
	(−2.6497)	(−4.3931)	(1.2783)	(1.1156)	(0.5678)	(0.5567)	(1.7486)	(1.9241)
INTERVIEWER		0.0505**		0.1298		−0.0199		0.2241*
		(2.1355)		(1.2905)		(−0.6344)		(3.8305)
ORALSKILL		0.0007		0.1017		0.0543		−0.0848
		(0.0089)		(0.2861)		(1.0330)		(−0.3725)
WILLHELP	0.1410***	0.1326***	0.3961*	0.3723*	0.0802	0.0802	0.3822*	0.3540*
	(3.2574)	(2.9612)	(3.0847)	(2.9860)	(1.3788)	(1.3161)	(3.6825)	(3.3493)
NOCARE	−0.2624***	−0.2611***	−0.2580***	−0.2564***	−0.2386***	−0.2383**	−0.4550***	−0.4449***
	(−11.5291)	(−11.9274)	(−23.1887)	(−21.3239)	(−7.0821)	(−7.0014)	(−13.2433)	(−12.9834)
NOTRUST	0.0025	0.0033	−0.1546**	−0.1520**	0.0233*	0.0235*	−0.0130	−0.0073
	(0.1279)	(0.1787)	(−7.3708)	(−6.3873)	(1.7020)	(1.8473)	(−0.7432)	(−0.3257)
SELFEMPLOYED	−0.2105	−0.1959	0.1917	0.2484	0.0067	0.0108	−0.7249	−0.6978
	(−1.0343)	(−0.9578)	(0.6080)	(0.7770)	(0.0276)	(0.0459)	(−1.6705)	(−1.5610)
EMPLOYER	−0.1002	−0.1006	−1.0541*	−1.0355*	−0.0271	−0.0224	−1.1816	−1.0648
	(−0.5768)	(−0.5752)	(−3.4686)	(−3.6235)	(−0.0723)	(−0.0586)	(−0.9676)	(−0.8791)
GOVERNMENT	−0.1733	−0.1795	−0.6248	−0.6513	0.0991	0.0891	−0.5774	−0.5665
	(−1.3498)	(−1.3660)	(−0.7200)	(−0.7910)	(1.4082)	(1.4404)	(−2.1931)	(−1.7664)
PRIVATECOM	−0.0447	−0.0539	−0.6075	−0.6121	−0.0912	−0.0950	−0.7080	−0.6715
	(−0.2887)	(−0.3600)	(−1.4315)	(−1.5545)	(−0.7625)	(−0.7816)	(−2.4160)	(−2.5221)
COLLECTIVE	−0.3171	−0.3335	−1.5450	−1.6028	−0.1024*	−0.1074*	−1.1251	−1.1555
	(−0.9057)	(−0.9713)	(−1.8010)	(−2.1053)	(−1.7677)	(−1.8861)	(−1.3282)	(−1.3229)
INCOME10K	0.8222***	0.8284***	−0.1144	−0.0925	0.0273	−0.0028	0.4974	0.5307
	(3.6339)	(3.9611)	(−0.2215)	(−0.1630)	(0.1142)	(−0.0103)	(0.3463)	(0.3846)
BMI	0.0074**	0.0079**	−0.0075	−0.0066	0.0028	0.0029	−0.0200	−0.0233*
	(1.9878)	(2.2677)	(−0.2992)	(−0.2790)	(0.2416)	(0.2707)	(−2.8249)	(−3.3792)
HEIGHT	0.9808***	1.0222***	−4.6627	−4.4901	−0.6793	−0.7185	0.0883	0.2953
	(2.9579)	(3.1348)	(−1.4278)	(−1.3883)	(−0.6623)	(−0.6928)	(0.0760)	(0.2887)
SHANGHAI	−0.3360***	−0.3381***	−0.4430	−0.4733	−0.0964***	−0.0989***	0.1769	0.1274
	(−2.6652)	(−2.8603)	(−0.8439)	(−0.8681)	(−3.2503)	(−2.8340)	(1.8657)	(1.2490)
ZHEJIANG	−0.1848***	−0.1982***	0.1055	0.0692	0.1395**	0.1401**	1.2081***	1.1269***
	(−3.2564)	(−3.3293)	(0.6559)	(0.4189)	(2.3113)	(2.2074)	(26.7352)	(24.5000)
MARRIED	0.1165	0.0959	−0.2102	−0.2527	−0.0386	−0.0414	−0.0055	0.0151
	(0.4491)	(0.3825)	(−0.2466)	(−0.3029)	(−1.4328)	(−1.3635)	(−0.0139)	(0.0394)
ELEMENTARY	0.2286***	0.2160***	0.1399	0.1218	0.1622	0.1583	0.1400	0.1604
	(4.0557)	(4.4745)	(1.2665)	(2.3450)	(1.6096)	(1.4752)	(0.3445)	(0.3902)
HIGHSCHOOL	0.2481***	0.2385***	1.0838	1.0448	0.1690**	0.1605*	−0.0410	−0.0105
	(6.9730)	(6.6617)	(2.2247)	(1.8779)	(2.2675)	(1.9371)	(−0.0845)	(−0.0202)
COLLEGE	0.4314	0.4131	2.2112*	2.1462*	0.4640	0.4456	−0.2995	−0.2097
	(1.4631)	(1.2628)	(2.9499)	(3.0535)	(1.2086)	(1.1429)	(−0.3291)	(−0.2079)
AGE	−0.0422***	−0.0395**	−0.0361	−0.0285	−0.0083	−0.0083	0.1695**	0.1853**
	(−2.9699)	(−2.2922)	(−0.3101)	(−0.2472)	(−0.1981)	(−0.1922)	(5.1477)	(5.8144)
AGE^2	0.0004***	0.0004**	0.0002	0.0001	−0.0000	0.0000	−0.0019**	−0.0020**
	(2.6855)	(2.0645)	(0.1264)	(0.0544)	(−0.0022)	(0.0002)	(−5.0773)	(−5.8739)
HEALTH	−0.2174***	−0.2157***	−0.7544*	−0.7442*	−0.1652***	−0.1613***	−0.2039*	−0.1925
	(−5.8689)	(−5.6108)	(−3.6801)	(−3.5085)	(−3.6503)	(−3.2546)	(−3.0180)	(−2.4022)
SICK	0.2700	0.2599	1.0969	1.0666*	−0.0199	−0.0252	−0.2199	−0.2742
	(1.5785)	(1.5702)	(2.8338)	(2.9256)	(−0.1444)	(−0.1843)	(−0.5803)	(−0.7547)
CHILDREN	0.0418	0.0397	0.2875**	0.2886**	0.0328	0.0344	0.7207	0.7178
	(1.0966)	(1.0081)	(9.4483)	(8.0865)	(0.6081)	(0.6231)	(2.2108)	(2.1606)
WORK	0.1423	0.1293	0.9395	0.9224	0.1301*	0.1373**	0.9399	0.8464
	(0.8449)	(0.7763)	(1.5210)	(1.5816)	(1.9537)	(2.1389)	(2.6587)	(2.5545)
CONSTANT	0.2988	0.2321	14.9960	14.3615	2.4715**	2.3529**	−0.8259	−1.1316
	(0.6242)	(0.6140)	(1.5641)	(1.3652)	(2.4056)	(2.5421)	(−0.4163)	(−1.1826)
Pseudo R^2			0.043	0.043			0.064	0.067
R^2	0.117	0.119			0.083	0.084		
Log-Like.	-948.065	-945.596	-5125.545	-5124.329	-780.235	-779.878	-3728.958	-3725.922
Observation	2066		1623		1655		1307	

[†]Estimated by probit (HELP0) and OLS (HELP+), and t-statistics in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level.

Table 17: Physical Attractiveness, and Assistance and Emotional Support[†]

Table 18: emotion

	MALE				FEMALE			
	HELP0	HELP0	HELP+	HELP+	HELP0	HELP0	HELP+	HELP+
BEAUTY	−0.0154	−0.0132	−0.0569	−0.0591	0.0946*	0.0936**	0.0881	0.0803
	(−0.3671)	(−0.3099)	(−0.2877)	(−0.2945)	(1.9592)	(1.9658)	(0.3709)	(0.3609)
INTERVIEWER		−0.0019		−0.0407		−0.0054		0.0887
		(−0.2472)		(−1.1726)		(−0.0842)		(1.2454)
ORALSKILL		−0.0245		0.0893		0.0506		0.1711
		(−1.1608)		(2.5231)		(0.4661)		(0.6793)
WILLHELP	0.1123***	0.1144***	0.1572*	0.1593*	0.0831***	0.0814***	0.1159	0.0959
	(6.2823)	(7.0040)	(3.0821)	(2.9290)	(3.2257)	(2.8274)	(1.2438)	(0.9059)
NOCARE	−0.1638***	−0.1639***	−0.0805	−0.0810	−0.1374***	−0.1365***	−0.0866	−0.0772
	(−24.2827)	(−23.6878)	(−1.3700)	(−1.3632)	(−21.8332)	(−22.5345)	(−2.5870)	(−1.8237)
NOTRUST	−0.0007	−0.0010	−0.0411	−0.0406	0.0056	0.0063	0.0252	0.0307
	(−0.0958)	(−0.1254)	(−1.1592)	(−1.1229)	(0.3674)	(0.4210)	(1.0525)	(1.1570)
SELFEMPLOYED	0.2153***	0.2129***	0.1809	0.1824*	0.1025	0.1073	−0.1993	−0.1965
	(4.5576)	(4.2325)	(2.7684)	(3.1047)	(0.5873)	(0.6415)	(−0.8091)	(−0.7623)
EMPLOYER	0.2141	0.2146	0.0597	0.0580	−0.3860	−0.3743	0.4185	0.4998
	(0.8950)	(0.8848)	(0.2518)	(0.2532)	(−0.9148)	(−0.8863)	(0.1799)	(0.2201)
GOVERNMENT	−0.0504	−0.0469	−0.2573	−0.2650	0.2048*	0.1938	−0.4311**	−0.4801***
	(−0.2548)	(−0.2379)	(−1.4582)	(−1.5189)	(1.6820)	(1.4742)	(−5.5150)	(−13.1604)
PRIVATECOM	−0.0255	−0.0239	0.0686	0.0664	−0.0915	−0.0919	−0.6163	−0.6013
	(−0.2480)	(−0.2266)	(0.5704)	(0.5743)	(−0.4603)	(−0.4529)	(−2.8725)	(−2.2664)
COLLECTIVE	−0.1279	−0.1238	−0.3959	−0.4090	0.3143*	0.3081*	−0.3000	−0.3338
	(−0.3534)	(−0.3364)	(−1.1119)	(−1.1695)	(1.8221)	(1.8275)	(−1.5353)	(−1.7573)
INCOME10K	0.4134**	0.4180**	−0.3887	−0.4175	0.5101*	0.4898**	0.0297	0.0024
	(2.0002)	(2.0797)	(−2.2650)	(−2.7698)	(1.7786)	(2.3280)	(0.0328)	(0.0029)
BMI	−0.0150***	−0.0149***	−0.0150*	−0.0160*	0.0087**	0.0086*	−0.0120	−0.0144
	(−4.0138)	(−3.9135)	(−3.8145)	(−3.9395)	(2.0879)	(1.7554)	(−0.8326)	(−0.9040)
HEIGHT	0.3702	0.3747	0.8237	0.7393	0.9547	0.9232	−1.3173	−1.2056
	(0.8295)	(0.8201)	(0.7024)	(0.6152)	(1.5127)	(1.4077)	(−0.4773)	(−0.4673)
SHANGHAI	−0.2015*	−0.2001*	−0.5283**	−0.5292**	−0.0713	−0.0757	−0.0268	−0.0832
	(−1.8855)	(−1.8642)	(−6.6265)	(−6.1795)	(−0.8511)	(−0.8706)	(−0.1386)	(−0.5884)
ZHEJIANG	−0.3178***	−0.3167***	−0.4659**	−0.4596***	−0.0443	−0.0472	−0.2678*	−0.3268**
	(−13.3764)	(−13.3035)	(−9.6463)	(−11.1290)	(−0.7868)	(−0.7265)	(−4.2614)	(−5.3052)
MARRIED	0.2359	0.2391	−0.3243	−0.3200	−0.1198	−0.1216	0.1564	0.1504
	(1.4063)	(1.4230)	(−1.3969)	(−1.4210)	(−0.8338)	(−0.8297)	(1.5643)	(2.1688)
ELEMENTARY	0.1731***	0.1776***	0.0204	0.0110	−0.0805	−0.0836	0.0104	0.0117
	(5.3744)	(6.4734)	(0.1010)	(0.0548)	(−1.1682)	(−1.0413)	(0.0328)	(0.0389)
HIGHSCHOOL	0.2150***	0.2203***	0.1222	0.1108	−0.0636	−0.0706	−0.0147	−0.0343
	(5.0571)	(5.1670)	(0.4251)	(0.3820)	(−0.6319)	(−0.5834)	(−0.0508)	(−0.1120)
COLLEGE	0.2933**	0.3020**	1.2501	1.2323	0.0161	0.0080	0.0574	0.0610
	(2.1538)	(2.1270)	(1.5461)	(1.5366)	(0.3367)	(0.1054)	(0.1216)	(0.1167)
AGE	−0.0045	−0.0052	0.0562	0.0560	−0.0485	−0.0479	0.0928	0.1125
	(−0.2920)	(−0.3318)	(1.2732)	(1.2376)	(−1.2492)	(−1.1991)	(1.0326)	(1.3793)
AGE^2	0.0000	0.0000	−0.0005	−0.0005	0.0004	0.0004	−0.0009	−0.0011
	(0.1246)	(0.1628)	(−0.8453)	(−0.8225)	(1.1542)	(1.1101)	(−0.9512)	(−1.2978)
HEALTH	−0.1609***	−0.1622***	−0.4358	−0.4343	−0.0932***	−0.0893***	−0.4252**	−0.4012**
	(−9.8742)	(−9.2549)	(−2.2655)	(−2.2345)	(−3.2610)	(−2.7559)	(−5.1974)	(−7.1755)
SICK	0.0172	0.0171	0.4224	0.4394	0.0782	0.0726	0.1323	0.0817
	(0.2386)	(0.2450)	(1.7510)	(1.7639)	(1.0883)	(0.9290)	(0.7177)	(0.3454)
CHILDREN	−0.0266	−0.0269	−0.0209	−0.0194	−0.0984**	−0.0968**	0.2987*	0.3017*
	(−1.0412)	(−1.0538)	(−0.6747)	(−0.6103)	(−2.1378)	(−2.0515)	(4.2566)	(4.2898)
WORK	−0.0538	−0.0528	0.3693	0.3781	−0.0907	−0.0892	0.5417	0.5049
	(−0.5119)	(−0.4854)	(1.5129)	(1.5149)	(−1.0248)	(−1.1102)	(1.8970)	(1.4866)
CONSTANT	0.2973	0.3658	1.6409	1.5107	0.5181	0.3931	2.6573	1.5400
	(0.4321)	(0.5407)	(0.5471)	(0.5022)	(0.7935)	(0.6738)	(0.4762)	(0.3646)
Pseudo R^2	0.063	0.063			0.051	0.052		
pseudo			0.023	0.022			0.023	0.026
Log-Like.	-1297.010	-1296.827	-3071.511	-3071.271	-1008.120	-1007.709	-2609.471	-2606.265
Observation	2066		1254		1655		1090	

[†]Estimated by probit (HELP0) and OLS (HELP+), and t-statistics in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level.

Table 19: Implication on the Wage Impact of Physical Attractiveness[†]

	WAGERATE							
	MALE				FEMALE			
BEAUTY	0.0481 (1.8834)	0.0468 (1.7529)	0.0494 (1.8555)	0.0461 (1.9848)	0.0663** (5.6473)	0.0665** (5.8796)	0.0677** (5.0147)	0.0650** (5.0636)
WILLHELP		0.0179 (2.0141)	0.0122 (0.9483)	0.0130 (0.7766)		−0.0004 (−0.0154)	0.0014 (0.0835)	0.0006 (0.0309)
NOCARE		−0.0068 (−0.8837)	−0.0018 (−0.4406)	−0.0027 (−0.6559)		−0.0107 (−0.6123)	−0.0143 (−0.8181)	−0.0135 (−0.6809)
NOTRUST		−0.0064** (−9.0612)	−0.0067** (−5.6464)	−0.0068** (−6.3906)		−0.0102 (−2.8255)	−0.0099 (−2.8728)	−0.0098 (−2.7100)
CONTACT			0.0153 (1.4751)	0.0146 (2.1511)			0.0160 (2.0940)	0.0153 (2.4161)
KNOW			−0.0419* (−3.1129)	−0.0373* (−3.3272)			−0.0482 (−1.6539)	−0.0464 (−1.8002)
HELP			0.0001 (0.0360)	0.0002 (0.0828)			0.0026 (0.3311)	0.0031 (0.4278)
HELPO			0.0907 (1.7129)	0.0846 (1.5774)			−0.0982 (−1.3617)	−0.0865 (−1.2130)
SUPPORT			−0.0017 (−0.3924)	−0.0022 (−0.6896)			−0.0141 (−1.4378)	−0.0148 (−1.6586)
SUPPORTO			0.0176 (1.8538)	0.0216 (2.4923)			0.0487 (0.6837)	0.0447 (0.5772)
ORALSKILL				0.1029** (4.4937)				0.1265** (5.3500)
INTERVIEWER				−0.0462 (−2.5219)				−0.0519* (−4.0986)
EMPLOYER	0.2737** (8.0513)	0.2730** (8.1806)	0.2483** (8.1227)	0.2439** (7.5589)	0.0901* (3.6587)	0.0833* (3.4565)	0.0452 (2.4772)	0.0473* (3.3483)
GOVERNMENT	0.9515*** (177.4663)	0.9462*** (318.0760)	0.9302*** (277.8340)	0.9163*** (67.5053)	0.6755** (5.2483)	0.6567** (5.7022)	0.6428** (4.7548)	0.6548** (6.2973)
PRIVATECOM	0.7948*** (16.3193)	0.7913*** (15.0437)	0.7777*** (15.8380)	0.7672*** (16.4738)	0.6402** (4.8402)	0.6371** (4.7074)	0.6205** (4.5256)	0.5751** (4.4517)
COLLECTIVE	0.3510** (5.2281)	0.3480** (5.1185)	0.3388** (4.4766)	0.3341** (4.3073)	0.1643*** (14.4110)	0.1650*** (20.2667)	0.1525*** (13.5638)	0.1388** (7.8447)
BMI	0.3513*** (18.4821)	0.3512*** (16.9296)	0.3483** (9.1609)	0.3403** (7.8767)	0.5705** (4.9372)	0.5609** (4.4625)	0.5332* (4.0487)	0.5110* (3.9137)
HEIGHT	0.0170** (5.1038)	0.0164** (5.4818)	0.0153** (5.7052)	0.0140** (4.6745)	−0.0042 (−0.4920)	−0.0034 (−0.4408)	−0.0046 (−0.6147)	−0.0048 (−0.6033)
SHANGHAI	1.3740* (3.5457)	1.3680* (3.5688)	1.3067* (3.2814)	1.2395* (3.2100)	0.2010 (0.4234)	0.2055 (0.3945)	0.2377 (0.4437)	0.1200 (0.2650)
ZHEJIANG	0.3953** (6.7084)	0.4010** (7.4744)	0.4121** (8.9150)	0.4050** (8.3531)	0.3290** (9.3697)	0.3466*** (30.6697)	0.3406*** (18.1539)	0.3455*** (46.4107)
MARRIED	0.1668** (6.2620)	0.1691** (6.7243)	0.1751** (8.1533)	0.1809** (7.8452)	0.0952 (2.4741)	0.1071* (3.7171)	0.1074* (3.5424)	0.1135** (5.4061)
NOEDU	0.0914** (6.3032)	0.0883** (4.7277)	0.0864* (3.1124)	0.0944 (2.5951)	0.0002 (0.0017)	−0.0012 (−0.0105)	−0.0031 (−0.0265)	−0.0046 (−0.0375)
ELEMENTARY	−0.0003 (−0.0031)	−0.0012 (−0.0108)	−0.0189 (−0.1903)	−0.0133 (−0.1501)	0.0202 (0.6574)	0.0193 (0.6137)	0.0217 (0.6335)	0.0211 (0.6737)
HIGHSCHOOL	0.0878 (0.5683)	0.0846 (0.5601)	0.0665 (0.4652)	0.0667 (0.5043)	0.2530 (1.6446)	0.2462 (1.5540)	0.2334 (1.4848)	0.2242 (1.5553)
COLLEGE	0.6182** (5.3533)	0.6045** (5.6201)	0.5700** (5.9739)	0.5568** (6.8953)	0.9989* (3.6963)	0.9797* (3.6252)	0.9755* (3.5791)	0.9582* (3.6678)
AGE	0.0643** (6.7607)	0.0649** (6.7996)	0.0654** (6.9196)	0.0660** (5.9796)	0.0467** (9.4071)	0.0474** (9.2401)	0.0497** (7.7425)	0.0508** (6.4431)
AGE^2	−0.0009*** (−11.5640)	−0.0009*** (−11.9704)	−0.0009*** (−12.8212)	−0.0009*** (−11.1379)	−0.0006** (−7.6054)	−0.0006** (−5.7952)	−0.0006** (−6.1746)	−0.0006** (−5.0575)
HEALTH	−0.1073** (−8.2984)	−0.1043** (−8.4275)	−0.0961*** (−16.0665)	−0.0957*** (−12.2680)	−0.1320 (−2.8120)	−0.1324 (−2.7286)	−0.1378 (−2.5382)	−0.1295 (−2.1444)
SICK	−0.0113 (−0.1781)	−0.0206 (−0.3201)	−0.0267 (−0.5998)	−0.0144 (−0.3241)	−0.1860 (−1.6868)	−0.1871 (−1.8556)	−0.1790 (−1.8542)	−0.1915 (−2.2200)
CHILDREN	0.0178 (0.4154)	0.0187 (0.4510)	0.0225 (0.5661)	0.0225 (0.5743)	−0.1165** (−8.1806)	−0.1107** (−8.9316)	−0.1061** (−8.9434)	−0.1016** (−9.3459)
CONSTANT	−1.0351 (−2.1824)	−1.0133 (−1.8853)	−0.8827 (−1.8506)	−1.0979 (−2.6828)	1.6975 (2.2245)	1.7885 (1.8528)	1.9165 (2.1242)	1.6658 (1.8311)
R^2	0.479	0.479	0.481	0.485	0.473	0.473	0.475	0.481
Observation	1460				803			

[†]Estimated by OLS and t-statistics in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level.
*Significant at the 10% level.

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