

Dynamic and Structural Features of Intifada Violence: A Markov Process Approach

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the daily incidence of violence during the Second Intifada. We compare several alternative statistical models with different dynamic and structural stability characteristics while keeping modelling complexity to a minimum by only maintaining the assumption that the process under consideration is at most a second order discrete Markov process. For the pooled data, the best model is one with asymmetric dynamics, where one Israeli and two Palestinian lags determine the conditional probability of violence. However, when we allow for structural change, the evidence strongly favors the hypothesis of structural instability across political regime sub-periods, within which dynamics are generally weak.

Keywords: Bayesian; conjugate prior; Israeli-Palestinian conflict; marginal likelihood.

Classification: C1, C2.

1 Introduction

The second Intifada, which is the latest episode in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, began on September 29, 2000, following Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount the day before. The violence quickly escalated and by the end of May 2007 a total of 5170 people (1023 Israelis and 4147 Palestinians) had lost their lives. These deaths occurred on 1366 (approximately 56%) of the 2436 total days during that period. Unfortunately, the casualties on both sides

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have overwhelmingly been civilian. Figure 1 shows the incidence of violence on both sides over the period September 29, 2000–May 31, 2007.

Concerns that Israel and the Palestinians were becoming involved in a spiraling cycle of violence and retaliation led to a wide international effort to put an end to the bloodshed. Diplomatic efforts included proposals by the Quartet (US, EU, UN, and Russia) and a number of summits and rounds of negotiation in Egypt, Jordan, and elsewhere. The results (the Mitchell Report, Tenet Plan, the Road Map, the Geneva Accord of 2003, etc.) were unanimous in recommending disengagement, either gradual or immediate, as a first step towards peace negotiations. The notion that a cycle of violence exists and feeds on itself motivates the first main goal of this paper, namely to examine the importance of conflict dynamics and whether the data are consistent with persistent and retaliatory (“tit-for-tat”) behavior.

The evolution of the Second Intifada and the historical events leading to it, against the backdrop of the wider Arab-Israeli conflict, have been well summarized in Kaufman, Salem, and Verhoeven (2006) and Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2003), and news summaries of the conflict appear regularly in the media. Against this background, several facts about the Second Intifada can be noted. Importantly, the Second Intifada, unlike the First Intifada of 1987-1990, has been a much more violent and prolonged conflict (the First Intifada claimed the lives of approximately 1,162 Palestinians and 160 Israelis). In addition, during the course of the Second Intifada, both sides experienced changes in policies and political leadership on several occasions. These political sub-periods are given in Table 1. Because of the length of the conflict and the differences in political regimes, it is less likely that the same dynamic process applies throughout. Indeed, a casual inspection of Figure 1 shows that the incidence of violence during the Second Intifada was not uniformly distributed, with several periods of

Sub-Period	Description
1. Oct 1, 2000–Feb 6, 2001	Barak period; Sharon elected Prime Minister
2. Feb 7, 2001–Feb 28, 2002	Sharon period before extreme violence
3. Mar 1, 2002–Apr 30, 2002	Extreme violence; operation “Defensive Shield”
4. May 1, 2002–Jun 30, 2003	Post extreme violence; Palestinian cease-fire
5. Jul 1, 2003–Nov 11, 2004	Post Palestinian cease-fire; Arafat dies
6. Nov 12, 2004–Jan 4, 2006	Post Arafat; Sharon’s second stroke
7. Jan 5, 2006–Jul 11, 2006	Olmert, Hamas governments elected; pre-Lebanon War
8. Jul 12, 2006–Aug 14, 2006	Lebanon War
9. Aug 15, 2006–Nov 25, 2006	Post-Lebanon War
10. Nov 26, 2006–May 31, 2007	Israeli-Palestinian truce signed by Abbas and Olmert

Table 1: Sub-periods of interest during the Second Intifada.

exacerbated violence and relative calm intermingled with each other. These considerations motivate the second main goal of this paper – to formally determine the importance of these particular policy changes on the occurrence of violence during the Second Intifada.

We approach these two main objectives by considering a number of models with different dynamic and structural characteristics. By formally comparing these models, we can get a sense of the relative weights that time series behavior on the one hand, and political change on the other, have in determining the incidence of violence.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the statistical model and the framework for model comparison and predictive analysis in this context. Section 3 discusses the data used in the study. Section 4 presents our main results, while Section 5 concludes.

2 Statistical Framework

The occurrence of violence on day t ($t = 1, \dots, T$) is captured by two binary indicator variables, I_t and P_t , where $I_t = 1$ if any Israeli deaths occur on day t ($I_t = 0$ otherwise), and similarly, $P_t = 1$ if any Palestinian deaths occur on day t ($P_t = 0$ otherwise). Therefore, on




Figure 1: Weekly fraction of violent days during the Second Intifada.

day t we observe the variable $y_t = (I_t, P_t)$, which can take one of four possible realizations: $y_t = (0, 0)$ (a peaceful day), $y_t = (1, 1)$ (a violent day), $y_t = (1, 0)$ and $y_t = (0, 1)$ (mixed days). We postulate (at most) a second order Markov structure for y_t on each day conditional on the outcomes on (at most) the two preceding days. Given a second order Markov structure for y_t , there are 16 possible data configurations of y_{t-1} and y_{t-2} for the preceding two days. The second order Markov process structure implies that the outcome y_t is related to the conditioning variables (y_{t-1}, y_{t-2}) through the transition matrix $\theta = [\theta_{ij|klmn}]_{16 \times 4}$, where the rows correspond to the possible values of (y_{t-1}, y_{t-2}) , the columns correspond to the possible outcomes for y_t , and the respective entries

$$\theta_{ij|klmn} = \Pr(y_t = (i, j) | y_{t-1} = (k, l), y_{t-2} = (m, n)), \quad \theta_{ij|klmn} \in \Theta,$$

give the transition probability of the trajectory $(y_{t-1} = (k, l), y_{t-2} = (m, n)) \rightarrow (y_t = (i, j))$, for $i, j, k, l, m, n \in \{0, 1\}$. In the preceding, the parameter space Θ consists of non-negative numbers which must sum up to 1 for each row of θ , *i.e.* since $\theta_{ij|klmn}$ are probabilities, they must satisfy $0 \leq \theta_{ij|klmn} \leq 1$ and $\theta_{00|klmn} + \theta_{10|klmn} + \theta_{01|klmn} + \theta_{11|klmn} = 1$ for each of the trajectories. The Markovian structure is thus a useful conceptualization for our data, which can alternatively be viewed nonparametrically as consisting of three-day strings taking on one of 64 possible configurations.

Upon letting $y = (y_1, \dots, y_T)$ denote all the data, the likelihood function factors as a product of multinomial likelihood contributions

$$\mathcal{L}(\theta; y) = \prod_{k,l,m,n \in \{0,1\}} \prod_{i,j \in \{0,1\}} \theta_{ij|klmn}^{T_{ij|klmn}}, \quad (1)$$

where $T_{ij|klmn}$ denotes the number of days in the sample corresponding to the string $(y_t = (i, j), y_{t-1} = (k, l), y_{t-2} = (m, n))$. Further, let $\theta_{klmn} = [\theta_{00|klmn}, \theta_{10|klmn}, \theta_{01|klmn}, \theta_{11|klmn}]$ denote the elements in row $klmn$ of θ and let $T_{klmn} = \sum_{i,j \in \{0,1\}} T_{ij|klmn}$ be the total number of days in the sample for which $(y_{t-1} = (k, l), y_{t-2} = (m, n))$.

A convenient family of conjugate priors for θ is a product of independent Dirichlet densities, one for each θ_{klmn} :

$$p(\theta) = \prod_{k,l,m,n \in \{0,1\}} \mathcal{D}(\theta_{klmn} | \underline{\mu}_{klmn}, \underline{\tau}_{klmn}) \quad (2)$$

where the Dirichlet density is given by

$$\mathcal{D}(\theta_{klmn} | \underline{\mu}_{klmn}, \underline{\tau}_{klmn}) = \left[\frac{\Gamma(\underline{\tau}_{klmn})}{\prod_{i,j \in \{0,1\}} \Gamma(\underline{\tau}_{klmn} \mu_{ij|klmn})} \right] \prod_{i,j \in \{0,1\}} \theta_{ij|klmn}^{\underline{\tau}_{klmn} \mu_{ij|klmn} - 1}$$

In (2) the preassigned hyperparameter vectors $\underline{\mu}_{klmn} = [\mu_{00|klmn}, \mu_{10|klmn}, \mu_{01|klmn}, \mu_{11|klmn}]'$ of positive quantities satisfy $\sum_{i,j \in \{0,1\}} \mu_{ij|klmn} = 1$ and $\underline{\tau}_{klmn} > 0$ is a scalar controlling the tightness of the prior beliefs around $\underline{\mu}_{klmn}$. Loosely speaking, $\underline{\tau}_{klmn}$ is the sample size of a

fictitious sample yielding the sample proportion $\underline{\mu}_{klmn}$. From the properties of the Dirichlet distribution, we know that the mean of θ_{klmn} is $\underline{\mu}_{klmn}$ and the variances and covariances are

$$Var(\theta_{ij|klmn} | \underline{\mu}_{klmn}, \mathcal{I}_{klmn}) = \frac{\underline{\mu}_{ij|klmn} (1 - \underline{\mu}_{ij|klmn})}{1 + \mathcal{I}_{klmn}} \quad (3)$$

and

$$Cov(\theta_{ij|klmn}, \theta_{qr|klmn} | \underline{\mu}_{klmn}, \mathcal{I}_{klmn}) = -\frac{\underline{\mu}_{ij|klmn} \underline{\mu}_{qr|klmn}}{1 + \mathcal{I}_{klmn}}. \quad (4)$$

In addition, marginal and conditional distributions are also Dirichlet.

Given $\underline{\mu}_{klmn}$ and \mathcal{I}_{klmn} , prior density (2) combines easily with likelihood (1) using Bayes' Theorem to produce the posterior density

$$p(\theta|y) = \prod_{k,l,m,n \in \{0,1\}} \mathcal{D}(\theta_{klmn} | \bar{\mu}_{klmn}, \bar{\mathcal{I}}_{klmn}), \quad (5)$$

which is also a product of independent Dirichlet densities, where

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{\mathcal{I}}_{klmn} &= \mathcal{I}_{klmn} + T_{klmn}, \\ \bar{\mu}_{ij|klmn} &= \frac{\mathcal{I}_{klmn} \underline{\mu}_{ij|klmn} + T_{klmn}}{\bar{\mathcal{I}}_{klmn}} \\ &= \left(1 - \frac{\mathcal{I}_{klmn}}{\bar{\mathcal{I}}_{klmn}}\right) \frac{T_{ij|klmn}}{T_{klmn}} + \left(\frac{\mathcal{I}_{klmn}}{\bar{\mathcal{I}}_{klmn}}\right) \underline{\mu}_{ij|klmn}, \\ \bar{\mu}_{klmn} &= [\bar{\mu}_{00|klmn}, \bar{\mu}_{10|klmn}, \bar{\mu}_{01|klmn}, \bar{\mu}_{11|klmn}]'. \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

Because of the prior independence in (5), the posterior analysis breaks into 16 independent analyses, one for each row of θ . The posterior mean in (6) is a convex combination of the prior mean and the sample proportion $T_{ij|klmn}/T_{klmn}$ (the maximum likelihood estimate). Posterior variances and covariances of θ_{klmn} are similar to (3)–(4) with $\underline{\mu}_{ij|klmn}$ and \mathcal{I}_{klmn} replaced by $\bar{\mu}_{ij|klmn}$ and $\bar{\mathcal{I}}_{klmn}$. Additional features of the distributions used here, as well as general discussion of the use of conjugate priors in Bayesian analysis, can be found in standard textbooks such as Zellner (1971), Poirier (1995), and Gelman *et al.* (2003). Important early

work on the estimation of multinomial probabilities in contingency tables includes Good (1965) and Fienberg and Holland (1973).

Before proceeding, we mention that the model presented above is fairly simple, but nonetheless appropriate for this setting. Similar models have been used in many fields of science including climatology and meteorology (e.g. Harrison and Waylen 2000), ecology and biology (e.g. Wootton 2001), and the health sciences (e.g. Sonnenberg and Beck 1993). We have confined our attention to this structure for two basic reasons. First, the main benefit of this model is that it is very clear. Its parameters are directly interpretable and unambiguous, which is an important consideration when one is trying to uncover basic features of the data in a case study. The second reason is that dynamic simplicity appeared to be favored by the model comparison framework to which we turn attention next.

2.1 Model Comparison and Prediction

In the context of the Second Intifada, our objectives are to (i) explore the dynamic characteristics of the process generating the violence and (ii) explore the stability of the process of violence across political sub-periods. These two issues are formally addressed by comparing several alternative models incorporating different dynamic and structural characteristics, through their marginal likelihoods and Bayes factors (Jeffreys 1961, Kass and Raftery 1995). In particular, for any two competing models \mathcal{M}_i and \mathcal{M}_j , upon using Bayes' theorem, the posterior odds can be written as

$$\frac{p(\mathcal{M}_i|y)}{p(\mathcal{M}_j|y)} = \frac{p(\mathcal{M}_i)}{p(\mathcal{M}_j)} \times \frac{p(y|\mathcal{M}_i)}{p(y|\mathcal{M}_j)}, \quad (7)$$

where the first fraction on the right hand side is known as the prior odds, and the second is called the Bayes factor. The Bayes factor, in turn, is the ratio of the marginal likelihoods

under the two models, where

$$p(y|\mathcal{M}_l) = \int_{\Theta} \mathcal{L}(\theta; y, \mathcal{M}_l) p(\theta|\mathcal{M}_l) d\theta, \quad (8)$$

and where the prior distribution and likelihood function now explicitly involve conditioning on the model indicator \mathcal{M}_l to underscore the dependence of θ on \mathcal{M}_l . Importantly, because of the tractability of the posterior distribution in our setting, the marginal likelihoods are available analytically as

$$p(y|\mathcal{M}_l) = \frac{p(\theta|\mathcal{M}_l)\mathcal{L}(\theta; y, \mathcal{M}_l)}{p(\theta|y, \mathcal{M}_l)} = \prod_{k,l,m,n \in \{0,1\}} \frac{\Gamma(\underline{\tau}_{klmn}) \prod_{i,j \in \{0,1\}} \Gamma(\bar{\tau}_{klmn} \bar{\mu}_{ij|klmn})}{\Gamma(\bar{\tau}_{klmn}) \prod_{i,j \in \{0,1\}} \Gamma(\underline{\tau}_{klmn} \underline{\mu}_{ij|klmn})}.$$

The marginal likelihoods obtained in this way can be used to assess the posterior odds in (7), or given a set of models $\{\mathcal{M}_1, \dots, \mathcal{M}_L\}$ under consideration, one can use the model probabilities $p(\mathcal{M}_i|y)$ for model averaging in predictive inference.

Two additional issues deserve emphasis in this setting. The first is that when comparing alternative models, the quantities in (7) and (8) should be computed using the same data y . This is particularly important when considering models with different dynamics and numbers of lags. Since in our application the largest model contains two lags, the first two days of the Intifada, September 29-30, 2000, are used as initial observations upon which all further analysis is conditioned; the effective sample therefore begins with October 1, 2000 ($t = 1$) and continues through May 31, 2007 ($T = 2434$). We use the same effective sample even for models with simpler dynamics (one lag or no lags) because the models being compared should be fit on the same data. The second issue is that when y is broken up into, say, J periods $y = (y_1, \dots, y_J)$, and within each period we allow for a different set of parameters so that $\theta = (\theta_1, \dots, \theta_J)$, each one independent of the other periods (so that $p(\theta|\mathcal{M}_l) = p(\theta_1|\mathcal{M}_l) \cdots p(\theta_J|\mathcal{M}_l)$), the marginal likelihood becomes the product of the

sub-period marginal likelihoods

$$\begin{aligned} p(y|\mathcal{M}_l) &= \int \mathcal{L}(\theta_1; y_1, \mathcal{M}_l) \cdots \mathcal{L}(\theta_J; y_J, \mathcal{M}_l) p(\theta_1|\mathcal{M}_l) \cdots p(\theta_J|\mathcal{M}_l) d\theta_1 \cdots d\theta_J \\ &= \prod_{j=1}^J \int \mathcal{L}(\theta_j; y_j, \mathcal{M}_l) p(\theta_j|\mathcal{M}_l) d\theta_j. \end{aligned}$$

Equivalently, on the log scale $\ln p(y|\mathcal{M}_l) = \sum_{j=1}^J \ln p(y_j|\mathcal{M}_l)$.

Finally, the one-day ahead posterior predictive mass function for y_{T+1} given y_T and y_{T-1} is

$$\begin{aligned} P_{ij|klmn} &= \Pr(y_{T+1} = (i, j) | y_T = (k, l), y_{T-1} = (m, n)) \\ &= \int_0^1 \theta_{ij|klmn} p(\theta_{ij|klmn}|y) d\theta_{ij|klmn} = \bar{\mu}_{klmn}, \end{aligned}$$

which is the posterior mean. Hence, appropriate credibility bands for this prediction are given by (3) with $\underline{\mu}_{klmn}$ replaced by $\bar{\mu}_{klmn}$ and $\underline{\tau}_{klmn}$ replaced by $\bar{\tau}_{klmn}$.

3 Data

We have compiled an up-to-date data set on the Second Intifada from www.btselem.org, an Israeli human rights organization that is well respected by both sides in the conflict, as well as by international organizations. From the last line of Table 2 it is seen that out of the 2434 observations between October 1, 2000 and May 31, 2007, 1070 (44%) correspond to peaceful days with no fatalities, 100 (4.1%) correspond to days with Israeli fatalities but no Palestinian fatalities, 1034 (42.4%) correspond to days with no Israeli fatalities but with Palestinian fatalities, and 230 (9.5%) correspond to violent days with both Israeli and Palestinian fatalities.

To assess temporal dependence, Table 2 also provides the number of transitions of the Markov process. The most common pattern (376 or 15.4% of the 2434 observations) corresponds to three consecutive days with no fatalities on either side. The next most common

(y_{t-1}, y_{t-2})	Number of transitions from (y_{t-1}, y_{t-2}) to y_t			
	$y_t = (0, 0)$	$y_t = (1, 0)$	$y_t = (0, 1)$	$y_t = (1, 1)$
(0, 0, 0, 0)	376	17	177	26
(0, 0, 1, 0)	19	2	14	3
(0, 0, 0, 1)	175	22	157	27
(0, 0, 1, 1)	26	3	15	10
(1, 0, 0, 0)	19	4	17	4
(1, 0, 1, 0)	3	0	2	0
(1, 0, 0, 1)	12	1	21	6
(1, 0, 1, 1)	4	0	3	4
(0, 1, 0, 0)	155	10	170	28
(0, 1, 1, 0)	16	4	20	3
(0, 1, 0, 1)	180	24	261	48
(0, 1, 1, 1)	31	2	62	21
(1, 1, 0, 0)	28	5	26	7
(1, 1, 1, 0)	3	0	10	1
(1, 1, 0, 1)	21	4	53	22
(1, 1, 1, 1)	2	2	26	20
$T_{ij} = \sum_{k,l,m,n} T_{ij klmn}$	1070	100	1034	230

Table 2: Number of days ($T_{ij|klmn}$) between Oct 1, 2000 and May 31, 2007 that fall within each category. The entries can be viewed as the number of Markov transitions from state $klmn$ to state ij as given in the rows and columns, respectively.

three-day pattern (261 or 10.7%) corresponds to three consecutive days with no Israeli fatalities but some Palestinian fatalities on all three days. The most common run-up to the violent days when both groups suffered fatalities was two days in which no Israeli fatalities occurred but Palestinian fatalities occurred (48 or 20.9% of the 230 days with violence on both sides). Four of the possible 64 transitions never occurred in the sample. Finally, note that the numbers in Table 2 are sufficient statistics, in that they are all that is required to construct the likelihood function.

4 Analysis

4.1 Choice of Priors

The posterior independence in (5) is quite useful as it aides interpretability and simplifies the analysis. However, it comes at a price: the need to elicit priors on the rows of θ . In the two-lag Markov model θ has 16 rows, which implies that 16 vectors $\underline{\mu}_{klmn}$ and 16 scalars τ_{klmn} should be determined in order to define the prior distributions. In this paper, we assign common values $\mu_{ij|klmn} = 0.25$ for the hyperparameters across (i, j, k, l, m, n) , implying that transitions are *a priori* equiprobable and do not favor any of the alternative outcomes. This is an important baseline case that is likely to appeal to a wide readership because of its neutrality on issues such as revenge, preemption, and persistence. To be cautious, however, we check the effect of this specification on our results by conducting a sensitivity analysis over three such priors with $\tau_{klmn} = 2$ (Jeffreys' prior, standard deviations equal to .25), $\tau_{klmn} = 4$ (uniform prior, standard deviations equal to .1936), and $\tau_{klmn} = 8$ (standard deviations equal to .1443). When considering no-lag, one-lag, and asymmetric lag models, the same Dirichlet priors are employed for the rows of θ (the only difference being that θ will have fewer rows, depending on the model).

4.2 Stability and Dynamics

The time series analysis here addresses two broad issues: correlation over time and stability over time. The first of these is addressed by introducing lags and the second by allowing for parameter change; both use up degrees of freedom, particularly the second. Permitting structural change to take place now implies that the data y can be split into J periods $y = (y'_1, \dots, y'_J)'$ and in each of these periods the models and parameters can be different. While this increases the complexity of the model that explains y (that model consists of

Israeli Lags	Palestinian Lags		
	0	1	2
0	-2637.21	-2594.59	-2581.36
1	-2614.34	-2584.37	-2575.23
2	-2608.44	-2585.70	-2585.04

Table 3: Log marginal likelihoods of alternative models for the pooled data October 1, 2000–May 31, 2007. The log marginal likelihood for the best model is in bold.

J sub-models—one for each sub-period), this can potentially result in more parsimonious models within the sub-periods. A model with many lags is less likely to favor breaking up the analysis into sub-periods because too many degrees of freedom are lost. Our results are consistent with these broad conclusions.

We take $\mathcal{I}_{klmn} = 4$ (uniform prior) as our reference point and look at $\mathcal{I}_{klmn} = 2$ as a loosening and $\mathcal{I}_{klmn} = 8$ as a tightening. This implicitly corresponds to “halving” or “doubling” the imaginary sample size used to construct the prior. In the following results, the differences between log marginal likelihoods are sufficient to overwhelm any reasonable choices of prior probabilities on the possible specifications. This holds for both model choice and model averaging of predictive results.

Tables 3 and 4 contain the posterior results corresponding to $\mathcal{I}_{klmn} = 4$. To allow for possible structural change, these tables present results for the Second Intifada as a whole, as well as the sub-periods determined by changes in leadership for both Israelis and Palestinians given in Table 1. As discussed in Section 2.1, to get the marginal likelihood of the structural change model for the entire period, one has to sum the log-marginal likelihoods for the sub-periods. The corresponding results for $\mathcal{I}_{klmn} = 2$ and $\mathcal{I}_{klmn} = 8$ are consistent with the results in Table 3 and are available upon request. From Table 3 it is seen that the largest log marginal likelihood for the pooled sample corresponds to a specification with asymmetric dynamics. In particular, the preferred model is one where two Palestinian and one Israeli

Israeli Lags	Palestinian Lags					
	0	1	2	0	1	2
	Subsample 1			Subsample 2		
0	-158.83	-159.15	-160.43	-480.93	-485.54	-486.93
1	-159.36	-160.79	-163.47	-485.58	-492.66	-497.26
2	-163.35	-165.83	-169.61	-488.61	-494.59	-499.10
	Subsample 3			Subsample 4		
0	-59.63	-60.59	-62.20	-491.76	-496.28	-504.45
1	-62.73	-64.01	-65.24	-495.22	-501.83	-509.96
2	-65.86	-67.54	-68.53	-501.55	-509.02	-520.90
	Subsample 5			Subsample 6		
0	-508.91	-513.67	-519.29	-364.71	-359.25	-365.82
1	-512.13	-519.18	-525.48	-358.74	-356.01	-365.24
2	-517.15	-527.26	-537.00	-359.75	-361.36	-369.17
	Subsample 7			Subsample 8		
0	-158.63	-162.82	-171.74	-33.27	-34.97	-38.35
1	-161.05	-166.03	-174.87	-34.51	-36.32	-39.63
2	-163.80	-168.86	-178.11	-35.67	-37.57	-40.78
	Subsample 9			Subsample 10		
0	-93.46	-96.28	-101.27	-134.59	-136.20	-144.03
1	-96.03	-98.64	-103.04	-137.15	-138.93	-146.86
2	-98.46	-101.74	-106.44	-139.69	-141.62	-149.54

Table 4: Log marginal likelihoods of alternative models in each sub-period (the log marginal likelihood for the best model in each sub-period is in bold).

lags determine the conditional probability of violence.

However, Table 4 shows that once the analysis considers the potential for heterogeneity among the various political regimes listed in Table 1, the data overwhelmingly favor more parsimonious specifications within the sub-periods. Indeed, splitting the sample according to the main political events during the course of the Second Intifada is important not only for testing dynamic stability, but also sheds light on the hypothesis that major political changes lead to distinct violence patterns across periods. In the sub-samples, the most preferred specification is the no-lag (simple multinomial) specification, except for the one-lag specification for sub-period 6 (Nov 12, 2004–Jan 4, 2006) between Arafat’s death and

Sharon’s second stroke. In particular, summing the log-marginal likelihoods for the best model in each sub-period from Table 4, one obtains a value of -2476.02 which is much higher than the value of -2575.23 for the best pooled data model in Table 3 (even if one were to restrict attention to simple multinomial models within each sub-period and ignore the first order dependence in sub-period 6, the marginal likelihood of the structural change model would still be -2484.72 , again higher than that for the best pooled data model). Hence, the data strongly favor structural change versus pooling.

We emphasize that in this analysis we do not attempt to relate priors or parameters from one period to the next. This is because each period begins with a significant political event (e.g. change of government) or the initiation of military activity (e.g. “Defensive Shield”, the Lebanon War), so that little continuity can be expected. The data and the results in Tables 3 and 4 indeed confirm that these politically distinct periods also translate into dissimilar periods of Intifada violence. Those particular inter-period differences are discussed in the next section.

4.3 Posterior Results and Prediction

The posterior means for each sub-period, which are also the one-step ahead predictive mass functions, are given in Table 5 for the $\tau_{klmn} = 4$ prior. The table contains the full set of transition probabilities for the bivariate process for $y_t = (I_t, P_t)$. The entries indicate that for periods 1, 4, 5, 8, and 9, the outcome $y_t = (0, 1)$ has the highest probability, while for periods 7 and 10 the most probable outcome is $y_t = (0, 0)$ (in period 2, these two outcomes appear equiprobable). The posterior probability estimates during the time of extreme violence (period 3 between March 1, 2002 and April 30, 2002) indicate that the outcome $y_t = (1, 1)$ is most likely; the severity of that episode is also reflected in the fact that the probability that no one dies on a given day is less than 5%.

Sub-period	Lags	$y_t = (I_t, P_t)$			
		(0, 0)	(1, 0)	(0, 1)	(1, 1)
1. Oct 1, 2000–Feb 6, 2001	none	.2857	.0677	.4737	.1729
2. Feb 7, 2001–Feb 28, 2002	none	.3836	.0844	.3836	.1483
3. Mar 1, 2002–Apr 30, 2002	none	.0462	.0308	.4000	.5231
4. May 1, 2002–Jun 30, 2003	none	.2721	.0628	.5256	.1395
5. Jul 1, 2003–Nov 11, 2004	none	.3988	.0317	.5000	.0694
6. Nov 12, 2004–Jan 4, 2006	$y_{t-1} = (0, 0)$.7473	.0320	.1922	.0285
	$y_{t-1} = (1, 0)$.2500	.1250	.5625	.0625
	$y_{t-1} = (0, 1)$.5210	.0336	.3950	.0504
	$y_{t-1} = (1, 1)$.2632	.0526	.4737	.2105
7. Jan 5, 2006–Jul 11, 2006	none	.5677	.0156	.3958	.0208
8. Jul 12, 2006–Aug 14, 2006	none	.2895	.0263	.6053	.0789
9. Aug 15, 2006–Nov 25, 2006	none	.3364	.0187	.5981	.0467
10. Nov 25, 2006–May 31, 2007	none	.7173	.0209	.2513	.0105

Table 5: Posterior means (equivalent to one-step predictive probabilities) for $y_t = (I_t, P_t)$ corresponding to $\tau_{ij|klmn} = 4$ for the preferred specification in each sub-period. In sub-periods 1-5 and 7-10 the best models are static, and in sub-period 6 the best model contains one Israeli and one Palestinian lag, resulting in 4 possible initial states.

For period 6, which is the only period characterized by first-order dynamics, the entries in Table 5 are consistent with retaliation dynamics and temporal persistence. This can be seen by considering pairs of entries $\theta_{ij|kl}$ for certain i, j, k , or l . For example, an interesting question to address is whether an Israeli fatality at time $t - 1$ increases the probability of a Palestinian death at time t . The fact that $\theta_{01|10} = 0.5625 > \theta_{01|00} = 0.1922$ and $\theta_{01|11} = 0.4737 > \theta_{01|01} = 0.3950$, $\theta_{11|10} = 0.1250 > \theta_{11|00} = 0.0285$ and $\theta_{11|11} = 0.2105 > \theta_{11|01} = 0.0504$, does indeed indicate an increased likelihood of Israeli action after a day with Israeli fatalities relative to one without. These effects are relatively large in size. The evidence on Palestinian retaliation is mixed since $\theta_{11|01} = 0.0504 > \theta_{11|00} = 0.0285$, $\theta_{11|11} = 0.2105 > \theta_{11|10} = 0.1250$, and $\theta_{10|01} = 0.0336 > \theta_{10|00} = 0.0320$, but $\theta_{10|11} = 0.0526 < \theta_{10|10} = 0.1250$; the effects are also weaker since the differences are smaller than in the Israeli case. Turning attention to persistence, the estimates suggest that Palestinian behavior is persistent (*i.e.*




Figure 2: Posterior probability of violence on each side during the Intifada sub-periods.

there is a higher probability of an Israeli death at time t given there was an Israeli fatality at time $t - 1$), since $\theta_{11|10} = 0.1250 > \theta_{11|00} = 0.0285$, $\theta_{11|11} = 0.2105 > \theta_{11|01} = 0.0504$, $\theta_{10|10} = 0.1250 > \theta_{10|00} = 0.0320$, and $\theta_{10|11} = 0.0526 > \theta_{10|01} = 0.0336$. On the other hand, the evidence of persistence in Israeli behavior (Palestinian deaths) is mixed: $\theta_{01|01} = 0.3950 > \theta_{01|00} = 0.1922$, $\theta_{11|11} = 0.2105 > \theta_{11|10} = 0.1250$, and $\theta_{11|01} = 0.0504 > \theta_{11|00} = 0.0285$, but $\theta_{01|11} = 0.4737 < \theta_{01|10} = 0.5625$. Finally, the steady-state (invariant) distribution of the Markov process for period 6 is given by $(0.6460, 0.0368, 0.2736, 0.0437)$.

From Table 5 one can also obtain various additional quantities of interest. Two such quantities are the marginal probabilities of violence for each side, $\Pr(I_t = 1|\cdot)$ and $\Pr(P_t = 1|\cdot)$, which are obtained by simply summing the columns in the Table where the corresponding violence indicator equals one. These within-period probabilities are given in Figure 2, and




Figure 3: Extended forecasts of the probability of violence for period 6 of the Intifada.

show the substantial variability among sub-periods. The probabilities are constant for periods 1-5 and 7-10, but depend on the outcomes in the preceding day during period 6, which is characterized by one-lag dynamics.

We mention that in a dynamic setting one can use this approach to produce extended (several-day-ahead) forecasts in a straightforward way when such forecasts are of interest, and that the long-run equilibrium forecast is given by the steady-state distribution of the Markov process (as reported above for period 6). An example of such multi-day forecasts is given in Figure 3, which shows the expected evolution of the probabilities of violence on each side under the four possible starting conditions for the first-order process in period 6. One message from the figure is that it does not take long for the process to converge to its steady-state values. Another message, seen by comparing the effects of violent days ($y_0 = (1, 1)$) or

mixed days ($y_0 = (0, 1)$ or $y_0 = (1, 0)$) to those of peaceful days ($y_t = (0, 0)$), is that violence on either side raises the prospects of violence for both Israelis and Palestinians in the days that follow.

5 Conclusion

This paper has analyzed data on the occurrence of violence in the Second Intifada using up-to-date data series from the conflict. The modelling framework adopted here requires very little in terms of modelling structure, and hence provides general descriptive characteristics of the dynamics and structural stability of the process. Our results indicate that the data are characterized by weak dynamics and strong instability across sub-periods, showing distinct violence patterns within each political regime. Considering the period October 1, 2000 – May 31, 2007 as the collection of separate political sub-periods in Table 1, we find robust evidence of distinct multinomial models over nine of these sub-periods, and a first-order Markov model for sub-period 6. One implication of this finding is that a fundamental and credible policy change would appear to offer the best prospects for peace, and that the dynamics of retaliation and persistence should not be a major impediment in achieving this goal.

The results of this paper provide ample motivation for further research into the nature of the conflict and its dynamics and stability. One avenue for research would be to use recent advances in the estimation of more sophisticated hierarchical models to attempt to capture the evolution of the probabilities through dynamic latent processes (e.g. Cargnoni *et al.* 1997, Sung *et al.* 2007) or through penalties for changes in the probabilities across periods (Gustafson and Walker 2003). Yet another avenue for research is to consider additional aspects of the conflict such as data on the intensity of violence, rather than just its occurrence.

As a step in this direction, an on-going analysis of the daily death counts is discussed in Jeliaskov and Poirier (2005).

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