

Public Choice III

Economics & Political Science 270C; Spring 2019
Amihai Glazer

Office Hours: Thursday, 1:30-3:30, Phoenix Grille

You need not have taken Public Choice I or Public Choice II to take this course.

The requirement for the course is to write a paper on the politics of some governmental policy. Thirty percent of the grade on the paper will be based on a preliminary version (due in week 6). Half of the grade on the paper will be based on the final version. And twenty percent will be based on weekly progress reports.

Overview

Miller, Gary (1997) "The impact of economics on contemporary political science." *Journal of Economic Literature* , pp. 1173-1204.

Besley, Tim "[The new political economy.](#)" Schnellenbach, Jan and Christian Schubert "[Behavioral Political Economy: A Survey](#)"

Voting

Reny, Philip J. □Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach *Economics Letters* 70.1 (2001): 99-105.

Downs, Anthony "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," *Journal of Political Economy* 65, no. 2 (Apr., 1957): 135-150.

Special interest politics

Milyo, Jeffrey, David Primo, and Timothy Groseclose (2000) "Corporate PAC campaign contributions in perspective." *Business and Politics* , 2(1): 75-88.

Austen-Smith, David (1995) "Campaign contributions and access." *American Political Science Review*, 89(3): 566-581.

Baron, David (1989) "Service-induced campaign contributions and the electoral equilibrium." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* , 104: 45-72.

Lohmann, Susanne (1998) "An information rationale for the power of special interests." *American Political Science Review* , 92(4): 809-827.

Baron, David and John Ferejohn (1989) "Bargaining in legislatures." *American Political Science Review*, 83(4): 1181-1206.

de Figueiredo, John M. and Brian Kelleher Richter (2013) "Advancing the empirical research on lobbying." National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 19698.

Fox Justin and Ruchard Van Weelden (2012) "Costly transparency." *Journal of Public Economics*, 96(1-2): 142-150.

The costs of influence

Dal Bo, Ernesto (2007) "Bribing voters." *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(4): 789-803.

Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantin Sonin (2013) "A political theory of populism." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 28(2): 771-805.

Coate, Stephen and Stephen Morris (1995) "On the form of transfers to special interests." *Journal of Political Economy*, 103(6): 1210-1235.

Commitment problems

Who will be the voters

Glaeser, Edward L. and Andrei Shleifer (2005) "The Curley Effect: The economics of shaping the electorate." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 21(1): 1-19.

[Brueckner, Jan](#) and Amihai Glazer (2008) "[Urban extremism.](#)" *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*, (Volume 24, No. 2, October), pp. 307-318.

What will future voters want

Dixit, Avinash and Barry Nalebuff, *Thinking Strategically*, Chapter 6.

Tabellini and Alesina (1990) "Voting on the budget deficit." *American Economic Review*, 80: 37-49.

Glazer, Amihai (1989) "Politics and the choice of durability." *American Economic Review*, 79(5): 1207-1213.

Tornell, Aaron (1991) "Time inconsistency of protection programs." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, August, 963-974.

Glazer, Amihai and Kai Konrad (1993) "The evaluation of risky projects by voters." *Journal of Public Economics*, 52(3): 377-390.

Persson, Torsten (1988) "Credibility of macroeconomic policy: An introduction and a broad survey." *European Economic Review*, March, 32: 519-532.

Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantin Sonin (2013) "A political theory of populism." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 28(2): 771-805.

Rent seeking

Morris, Stephen (2001) "Political correctness." *Journal of Political Economy*, 109(2): 231-265.

Besley, Tim "[Political agency and accountability.](#)"

Aidt, Toke S. (2016) "Rent seeking and the economics of corruption." *Constitutional Political Economy*, 27: 142-157.

de Figueiredo, John M., and Brian Kelleher Richter (2014) "Advancing the empirical research on lobbying." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 17: 163-185.

Nti, Kofi O. (1999) "Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations." *Public Choice*, 98: 415-430.

Munster, Johannes (2006) "Lobbying contests with endogenous policy proposals." *Economics and Politics*, 18(3): 389-397.

Epstein, Gil S. and Shmuel Nitzan (2015) "Contestable policies." In Roger D. Congleton and Arye L. Hillman, eds. *Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking*. Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 53-72.

Aidt, Toke S. (2016) "Rent seeking and the economics of corruption." *Constitutional Political Economy*, 27: 142-157.

Pay in Government

Braendle, Thomas (2015) "Does remuneration affect the discipline and the selection of politicians? Evidence from pay harmonization in the European Parliament." *Public Choice*, 162(12): 1-24.

Decarolis, et al. (2018) "Bureaucratic competence and procurement outcomes." National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 24201

Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan (2009) "Motivating politicians: The impacts of monetary incentives on quality and performance." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 14906.

Gagliarducci, Stefano, and Tommaso Nannicini (2013) "Do better paid politicians perform better?"

Disentangling incentives from selection." *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 11(2): 369-398.

Geys, Benny, Tom-Reiel Heggedal, and Rune J. Sorensen (2017) "Are bureaucrats paid like CEOs? Performance compensation and turnover of top civil servants." *Journal of Public Economics*, 152: 47-54.

Mocan, Naci, and Duha T. Altindag (2013) Salaries and work effort: An analysis of the European Union parliamentarians." *Economic Journal*, 123(573): 1130-1167.